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1. INTRODUCTION: Wittgenstein’s spade: Jonathan Mair and Soumhya 
Venkatesan (University of Manchester). 
Speakers invited to debate a motion are expected to emphasise the differences 
between their own view and that of their opponents, and to play down the similarities. 
When the imperatives of competition are set aside and arguments are considered with 
a cool head, it often turns out that the two sides have more in common than they 
realised or were willing to admit. Sometimes what appeared in the heat of the moment 
to be material disagreements turn out to be differences in favoured definitions of the 
key terms, in which case there is no fact of the matter to disagree about. These 
observations apply to the 2013 meeting of GDAT to some extent, but there was at 
least one issue on which the speakers did disagree, a subtle but profound one, one that 
we think has important implications for the anthropology of ethics.  
We will return to that issue at the end of this short introduction. First, though, we turn 
to the areas of only apparent disagreement. A central element of Das and Al-
Mohammad’s argument was a homology based on a triple opposition of forms of 
temporality (the everyday/the event), forms of action (just doing/acting on reflection), 
and forms of ethics (truly ethical/normative). They describe what they see as a truly 
ethical form of spontaneous action that they have observed among the people they 
write about. This is ‘just doing’, which occurs in ‘the everyday’ and is not based on 
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stipulated rules. We are thrown into life, Al-Mohammad says, and we do what we do 
—we do not stand back and think, ‘why am I doing this?’ ‘Is it good?’  
This form of ethical life requires vindication, they claim, against a view of ethics in 
anthropology that they attribute to the opposition team, one based on an objectified, 
abstract idea of the good, in which action is formulated non-spontaneously through 
self-conscious intellectual reflection on fixed rules, not in ‘the everyday’, but in the 
context of ‘the event’.  
Two prominent elements in the literature of the literature on the anthropology of 
ethics make this picture plausible. The first is Jarrett Zigon’s discussion of moral 
breakdown—which he argues forces people into ethical reflection by disrupting the 
unthinking and habitual repetition of everyday life (2007; 2009); the second, James 
Laidlaw’s Foucauldian inspired anthropology of ethics with its focus on freedom, 
reflection and sustained ethical projects (Laidlaw, 2013).  
However, the opposition team’s arguments seem to us to fit awkwardly, if at all, into 
the proposition’s model of the anthropology of ethics, and so for the most part are not 
vulnerable to their attacks. Neither opposition speaker emphasises reflection in their 
argument here and Stafford’s argument seems particularly difficult to criticise on that 
basis because of the emphasis he puts on the role of emotion—what is distinctive 
about ethical judgments, he says, is that we feel them. Das criticises the use of the 
concept of ‘the event’ in Robbins’ published work, associating it with Badiou’s 
contempt for ordinary life. But Robbins does not really oppose the event to the 
everyday. His interest is in the importance of the notion of conversion as a definitive 
rupture with the past and its consequences for our understanding of culture in a 
Christian context. In any case, his arguments here, like those of Stafford, are not 
obviously related to any particular form of temporality. 
The point about normativity, mainly developed in Al-Mohammad’s speech, seems to 
us to have more bite. Drawing on Kant’s distinction between genuine ethics and the 
automatic adherence to rules, Al-Mohammad argues that any concept of the good that 
relies on a stipulated set of norms cannot be ethical. Stafford and Robbins each define 
the good in two ways: first formally, and then in terms of specific content. For 
Robbins, the good is that overarching value or goal for which people aim and in terms 
of which they judge, for Stafford, the good has to do with the process by which we 
make judgments that are emotional. These formal definitions define the good as a 
process that could be applied to any content, and they therefore appear to escape Al-
Mohammad’s Kantian critique.  
However, both opposition speakers also venture substantive definitions of the good. 
For Robbins, notwithstanding cultural variation, the content of the good always 
relates to the social, it is about relationships. For Stafford, some of the judgments 
about which we emote are culturally variable, but many—the value of reliability, the 
prohibition of incest—are universal, as Westermarck’s survey demonstrated. In terms 
of these substantive definitions of the good, both opposition arguments may be 
vulnerable to Al-Mohammad’s ‘puppet effect’ critique. Interestingly, the strand of the 
anthropology of ethics that has most rejected normativity in this sense is the 
Foucauldian virtue ethics strand that emphasises reflexivity.  
Now to turn to the issue on which the two sides are most clearly divided: is 
meaningful action always to be understood in terms of one or more overarching 
goals, or can some forms of action be understood, in the last analysis, only in their 
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own terms? The distinction may appear mystifying at first, but it is clarified in a 
passage of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Reflections (217) to which Das referred in 
her answer to Andrew Irving’s question in the discussion that followed the opening 
speeches: 
“How am I able to obey a rule?” – if this is not a question about causes, then it 
is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. 
If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is 
turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do.”  
In these terms, each side has a different view of the bedrock of human action, the end 
of explanation from which the spade of analysis rebounds.  
Das and Al-Mohamad paint a picture of human action in which (some?) action is 
simply its own explanation—there is nothing more to say. For Das, things people do 
can escape language, they do not always join up – this makes speaking about ‘the 
good’ as inexplicable as speaking about ‘the bad’. Al-Mohammad complements Das’s 
approach by his insistence on the ‘thrown-ness’ of life, the embeddedness of people in 
the flux of life.  
By contrast, for Robbins action is to be explained in terms of the attractiveness of ‘the 
good’, the ultimate good in which chains of value culminate. Stafford emphasises the 
emotional pull of the good and conversely the repugnance and disgust people feel 
when faced with the bad. While both Robbins and Stafford are cautious about 
definitively identifying the content, both are clear that people across the board 
recognise some things as the good. For Stafford this recognition itself has moral 
significance as an argument about humanity belonging to a single species. He also 
makes other, more subtle, arguments about the effects of proximity vs distance and 
the resulting generosity and between humans in the aggregate and individuals who are 
in particular relationships to one. 
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2. THE PRESENTATIONS 
VEENA DAS: EVERYDAY LIFE AND ITS MODERATE AMORALITY 
It is a great privilege to be here in Manchester in a debate with my honorable 
opponents Joel Robbins and Charles Stafford on the question of the good. At the 
outset I wish to state clearly that the debate, as I see it, is not about the metaphysical 
question of whether something like “the good” exists. We have already managed to 
perform the magic tricks of conjuring lots of things in anthropology – nature, 
humanity, society – and then making them disappear. Let us then leave questions 
about existence to theologians and metaphysicians – and, instead, ask what kinds of 
discursive regimes are enabled when we name something as “the good”, a value that 
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is made to stand apart from the flux and flow of everyday life and bestowed with a 
thing like quality, My colleague Hayder Al-Mohammad, will show that in supporting 
this motion we are contesting precisely this temptation to separate out and name what 
is a normal stance people take in their attentiveness toward each other and thus to 
perform a baptism that will create boundaries around “the good” arrogating to 
anthropology the right to judge the behavior of others, good intentions not 
withstanding.  
For the anthropologist, the question might be reframed as follows. In his impressive 
formulation on the history of sexuality and its relation to the truth speaking discourses, 
Foucault showed that constituting sexuality as a subject in its own right with its 
accompanying notions of truth telling created the conditions for certain ways of 
talking about sex (see Davidson 1994). We might similarly ask, what is the talk about, 
when we are confronted with such phrases as the “ethical turn” or “toward an 
anthropology of the good” to suggest that a revolution of thought in anthropology is 
around the corner. We might wish to inquire what is it that such talk enables as a 
discursive practice? 
I am fortunate in having Joel Robins as the first opponent of the motion for he has, 
indeed, made a strong cases for arguing that anthropology has become stuck in what 
he calls a “suffering slot” - a stance in which, he says, it has abandoned the long 
cherished concept of cultural difference and replaced it by a sentimental rendering of 
“suffering” that manipulates us emotionally by evoking such notions as empathy or 
witnessing that seek to connect humans directly without the mediating concepts of 
culture (Robbins 2013). For Robbins, this is a symptom of the decline of 
anthropology and the cure is to turn it toward an “anthropology of the good.” Robbins 
contends that fortunately there are global events that point to the fact that salvation 
might be around the corner – he specifically picks up two such events - that of the 
growth of the Pentecostal movement around the world which, according to him, 
shows that people everywhere are looking for the good. This popular turn to the 
search for the good is mirrored in uncanny ways for Robbins in the interest that 
current philosophy has shown in the “Pauline event” (Robbins 2010) thus signaling 
the importance of a particular picture of the good as an unexpected event which 
anthropology can capitalize on to make itself relevant for the current moment. This 
kind of theorizing on the good, I submit, is symptomatic of a certain tiredness of 
having to deal with the quotidian forms of suffering in anthropology (as, indeed, in 
popular culture, resonating in terms such as donor fatigue that circulate in the media) 
and to my ears it repeats the promise of salvation that I have come to distrust, whether 
it is couched in religious or secular terms (see Das 2007: 44). 
Here is how Robbins frames the philosophical moment and invites anthropology on 
the name of the good to seize this moment: 
In certain high-visibility philosophical circles, the early twenty-first century 
has belonged surprisingly to St. Paul. Held up by Giorgio Agamben, Alain 
Badiou, and Slavoj Zizek, among others, as a figure who models the nature of 
radical change that arrives not as a teleological march of progress but rather 
as an unexpected event.” (Robbins 2010:633) 
Inviting a dialogue between the “high-visibility” philosophers and the anthropologists 
of Pentecostal Christianity, Robbins says –“anthropologists can bring to this 
encounter materials pertaining to the way actually existing Pauline transformations 
work in the contemporary world, while the philosophers can bring carefully 
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conceptualized models of change as radical discontinuity and event.” (Robbins 2010: 
636)  
It is worth spending a few moments on the picture of everyday life in Alain Badiou 
(2001), the philosopher whose notion of the Pauline event has served as inspiration 
for Robbins. It is not Badiou’s philosophical sophistication that I doubt but his 
sensibility to the everyday and his barely hidden contempt for those for whom 
securing the everyday might itself be an achievement. Badiou argues that to be 
awakened to one’s life is linked to the fidelity that one shows to the figure of radical 
change – otherwise you are but an animal stuck in “the situation.” Badiou’s language, 
when he is discussing the division between those who recognize the good and those 
who remain indifferent to it, is tinged with a violence that I find hard to accept. Either, 
he says, you show your fidelity to the (Pauline like) event or you remain in the 
situation and in the latter case you are but “bipeds without feathers, mere acculturated 
ants.” It is true that Badiou has argued that the affirmative account of the good that he 
is providing is not dependent on St. Paul and that there are secular examples such as 
that of Galileo and that of the French Revolution in which the event could not be 
absorbed within the existing categories of the situation. However, the violence of the 
language that he uses against those who do not show this awakened quality, this 
fidelity to the radical event, carries strong religious overtones and he seems deaf to 
the fact that it is precisely such language that has been used to perpetrate enormous 
violence against the non-believers – those who did not believe in the miracle of Christ 
or those who did not believe in the miracle of the Communist revolution. Thus the 
first thing the talk of the good enables Robbins and his high profile philosophers to do 
is to launch a savage attack on everyday life itself – elsewhere I have argued that a 
barely suppressed violence against the everyday is indicative of philosophy’s urge to 
and investment in escaping the everyday (see Das 2007; Das et al 2014). 
Anthropology, many of us thought, was a discipline that showed more patience 
toward the work of the everyday not only in its attempt to understand the lives of 
ordinary people but also in tracking he conceptual labor entailed in products of 
thought in such forms, as myths or rituals (for a further discussion, see Das et al 2014). 
In contrast, the division of labor proposed by Robbins – they, the philosophers, will 
give us the theory and we, the anthropologists, will tell them how things are on the 
ground - inaugurates yet again a subservience to philosophy as the “queen of 
sciences”. I had thought that anthropology had overcome this diffidence when Lévi-
Strauss (1966, 1981) showed decisively against Sartre that the “primitive” was 
perfectly capable of rational thought and that it was misleading to characterize 
collective modes of thought as expressed in myth to be purely expressions of emotive 
reactions to the world (Das et al 2014).  
Now let us turn to the second thing the talk of the turn to the good authorizes as it 
seeks to delegitimize the work that has emerged on the theme of social suffering. 
Though not immediately evident, I will argue that a close attention to the way 
Robbins goes about identifying the grand events in anthropology in relation to social 
suffering, rests on the unexamined idea of anthropology as a discipline in which all 
theoretical moves happen in Western universities while the history of anthropology in 
other non-Western countries is reduced to that of consumption of ideas rather than 
their production. I am not interested in making this point as a moral point but rather in 
reflecting on the processes through which particular maps of knowledge are created - 
much as Foucault’s notion of parrēsia, or truth-telling as an ethical force asked us to 
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consider, not the opposition of truth and falsity but the relation between truth and its 
doubles. 
Consider, Madame Chairperson and Members of the House, how Robbins presents his 
argument in the claims that the study of the good inaugurates a new moment in 
anthropology. He first traces the great “reflexive turn” in anthropology to the 1980s 
when, he says, that anthropologists turned from the study of societies defined as 
“other” (often equated with “primitive”) to the study of their own societies. He 
contends, after Trouillot, (1991) that the reason anthropology turned away from the 
study of the primitive was because the figure of the primitive that had occupied the 
savage slot in anthropology did not fulfill the cultural needs of European societies any 
longer. While applauding Trouillot for the theorizing from the heights of a mountain 
top, Robbins also detects a lack in that Trouillot (and proponents of the reflexive turn) 
did not speculate on what has replaced this savage slot that the other occupied? 
Robbins then identifies this empty space as having been filled by another slot – that of 
the “suffering subject”. Perhaps a short citation will help to see how the 
understanding of issues relating to pain, poverty, or violence are seen as having led to 
the loss of critical force in anthropology. Here is how Robbins summarizes the issue 
of the figure that has replaced the primitive other as the object of anthropological 
attention. “ I argue here that from the early 1990s onward to an important extent it has 
been the suffering subject who has come to occupy its spot, the subject living in pain, 
in poverty, or under conditions of violence or oppression now stands at the centre of 
anthropological work.” (Robbins 2013: 448). Finally, Robbins detects another move 
now that he sees as a positive one in which different topics – a laundry list includes 
value, imagination, gift, time, empathy, hope – all of which are likely to coalesce in 
his mind toward the anthropology of the good. 
I submit that there is a curious analogy between the colonial modes of talking about 
the good and the teleological model in which trust is placed in sudden upheavals, 
unexpected events – the colonial contests being one example – through which a 
civilizing mission is instituted. Consider each of the moments of the paradigmatic 
shifts that Robbins identifies and notice please that these happen primarily within 
Western stories of the creation of anthropological knowledge. First, Robbins endorses 
the notion that the challenge to anthropology as the study of the primitive other 
happened with the Writing Culture moment when anthropology turned to the study of 
one’s own society by Western scholars. But this particular recounting completely 
ignores the fact that the study of one’s society was already the corner stone of other 
anthropologies such as in India, China and Brazil (see Das 1991; de Castro 1998; 
Peirano 1998; Srinivas 1966, 1997 for a further discussion on these issues ). As 
Periano (1998) has noted, it is as if any local story told by a North American 
anthropologist becomes a universal story whereas even major theoretical innovations 
in anthropologies considered to be peripheral (as in Indian or Brazilian anthropology) 
are merely local stories. I have no objection to grounding one’s theories in one’s 
experiences as long as these are not then used to obliterate other histories of 
anthropology to make grand claims about “anthropology” with a capital A.  
As for the central figure of the primitive other, the story is more complex as we begin 
to see anthropology not simply as a product of European imagination but as made up 
of different streams – for instance Alfred Gell’s (1997) seminal work on tribal 
communities in middle India shows that the relation between the Hindu king and his 
tribal subjects was defined by a complex set of rituals that drew on a rather longer 
term cultural logic that the colonial government completely failed to understand. I am 
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not denying the power of European colonialism but the trend to assimilate all history 
into a unitary “world history” or “anthropology” denies the manner in which 
particular local or national histories (including histories of disciplines) reflect the 
ability to make the discipline. When we come to the so-called shift from a savage slot 
to a suffering slot it becomes obvious that even if there were merit in this formulation, 
it would at best describe some parochial developments rather than grand events in the 
history of anthropology. Yet in Robbins’ discussion there are repeated assertions 
about this or that seminar in a department of anthropology in North America that 
persuades him that an ethos of privileging the suffering subject was the most 
important component of anthropological thinking and needed to be contested by 
showing the importance of a turn toward the good.  
Let me finally take one of the examples that Robbins takes to support his argument 
that the shift to the suffering subject has taken away the critical force of anthropology 
and that turning to an anthropology of the good would reinstate that critical force. 
Referring to Valentine Daniel’s (1998) paper “Crushed glass, or, is there a 
counterpoint to culture? “ Robbins focuses especially on Daniel’s formulation that the 
suffering he documented of survivors (whether victims or witnesses), “resists the 
recuperative power of culture.” He faults Daniel for not providing the cultural context 
of the narratives he collected from two brothers who saw gangs of Sinhala youth kill 
their elder brother and father. Now it is true that Daniel who had gone to Sri Lanka to 
do work on folk culture was confronted suddenly with stories of the horrendous 
violence that had been unleashed on the Tamil population in the 1983 riots and 
subsequent escalation in militancy and in the state violence. I read Daniels as resisting 
the idea that any consolation was to be had in the recuperative powers of culture. It 
makes no sense to me to juxtapose Daniel’s account of the trauma these two brothers 
relate in the aftermath of the horror they witnessed to the criticism of trauma theories 
and their deployment by state institutions dealing with asylum cases in France that 
Fassin and Rechtman (2009) show in their book, The Empire of Trauma. In the first 
case the victims and survivors were trying to have their story told in the context of 
complete denials of violence against the Tamils by the Sinhala state – in the second 
case the trauma theory was a tool in the hands of powerful state agents and their 
accomplices to regulate claims for asylum. Should one be surprised that it is the same 
scholar who is asking for “cultural context” who manages to completely obliterate the 
differences of power within which these narratives unfold? So great is the lure of the 
good, that power disappears in rethinking the social. 
It is true that confronted with such violence as Daniel first dared to bring into 
anthropological thought unhinges one’s ability to work within received categories – 
and in his first accounts of this violence Daniel made an appeal to our humanity. But 
it is also the case that in both, his earlier work on the suffering of tea plantation Tamil 
laborers and his book on the violence in Sri Lanka. Daniel shows us what historicized 
forms of violence and suffering take us to the edges of experience and makes us 
question any easy notion of the human (Daniel 1993, 1997). Let me then offer another 
example from Daniel’s work. 
Let us recall that Daniel (1997) interviewed several young men in Sri Lanka who 
were members of various militant movements and who had killed with ropes, 
knives, pistols, automatic fire, and grenades. But what seems to me as traumatic for 
Daniel in hearing these accounts of killings was the manner in which the styles of 
killing and the wielding of words were interwoven. Here is one account given by 
some young men about a particular scene of killing of a young Tamil boy. 
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He was hiding in the temple when we got there.... This boy was hiding 
be- hind some god. We caught him. Pulled him out. …The boy was in the 
middle of the road. We were all going round and round him. For a long 
time. No one said anything. Then someone flung at him with a sword. 
Blood started gush- ing out. ... We thought he was finished. So they 
piled him on the tyre and then set it aflame. (Daniel 1997:209) 
Daniel finds the shifting between the ‘we’ and the ‘they’ to be noteworthy, but 
what stuns him is the next thing that happened. 
This was the early days of my horror story collecting and I did not know 
what to say. So I asked him a question of absolute irrelevance to the issue 
at hand. 
Heaven knows why I asked it; I must have desperately wanted to change 
the subject or pretend that we had been talking about something else all 
along. "What is your goal in life?" I asked. The reply shot right back: "I 
want a video (Video Cassette Recorder: VCR)." (Daniel l997: 209) 
What comes across to me here is not that Daniel is appealing to a common humanity 
but that no picture of the human we might have cherished is going to help here just as 
no picture of culture will help. Indeed if Daniel were to have followed the impulse to 
track this back to some aspect of Tamil culture, as present day explanations for 
terrorism that track it to Islamic culture try to do, he would have failed any test of 
fidelity to this kind of event. It is not that one cannot understand the utterance about 
wanting a VCR, but that in this context when these words are spoken, they seem not 
to belong- they seem not to have a home. It is not my contention that the social is 
not relevant here or that working on suffering does not entail risks of voyeurism, or of 
pornographic rendering of horror. Rather, I am arguing that within the same scene of 
violence and suffering we also get glimpses of care, solidarity, and ability to resist the 
collective madness as Daniel finds in the small gestures of a Sinhala woman quietly 
placing her hand on the lap of a Tamil school teacher who is sitting beside her when 
the bus they are travelling in, is attacked by a Sinhala mob – thus creating the 
impression of a Sinhala couple.  
Finally, let me take a view that Sandra Laugier (2009) characterizes as that of 
“ordinary realism” in which we see suffering , pain, attention to the concrete others 
(rather than grand Other) in out life as the way to think of how anthropology might 
respond in a plural world to events that anthropologists who find it difficult to buy the 
promises of either religious salvation or neoliberal freedom, given the conditions they 
encounter, are trying to give expression to. As Peter Sloterdijk (1987) puts it, 
everyday life lives on essentially in a moderate amorality and is satisfied when things 
remain in this moderation… this is simultaneously the reason why people with a fairly 
solid and just feeling for reality are against harshness in matters of punishment in the 
name of autonomous values such as justice, goodness, honor, etc.. They know that 
punishment in its strict moralism can be more immoral than the actions of those who 
are to be judged by applying these values to them.  
In supporting this motion, members of the house, you would be supporting such a 
view of the everyday in which something called “the good” does not stand in 
alienated majesty separated from all suffering and pain or from the everyday realism 
that the Hindus call the age of kaliyuga – an age when you endure both misfortune 
and small fortunes as simply signs of the age we all live in. You would also be 
 9 
rejecting the idea that “the good” is the common ingredient of the laundry list of 
topics that Robbins has helpfully provided us with in his programmatic statements 
just as alcohol might be seen as the common ingredient in beer and wine. Let us not 
forget that after all even gay science was never so gay as to forget the wounds and 
vulnerabilities from which it sprang.  
References 
Badiou, Alain. 2001 Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil (trans. and 
introduction by Peter Hallward). London: Verso. 
Davidson, Arnold. 1994. "Ethics as ascetics: Foucault, the history of ethics, and 
ancient thought." The Cambridge Companion to Foucault. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press: 123-148. 
Das, Veena. 2007. Life and Words: Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary. 
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Das, Veena, Michael Jackson, Arthur Kleinman and Bhrigupati Singh. 2014. 
“Introduction. Experiments between anthropology and philosophy: Affinities and 
antagonisms” in the Ground Between: anthropologists Engage Philosophy (ed. Veena 
das et al). Durham: Duke University Press: 1-26. 
Daniel, Valentine E. 1993. "Tea talk: violent measures in the discursive practices of 
Sri Lanka's estate Tamils." Comparative Studies in Society and History 35.03: 568-
600. 
Daniel, E. Valentine. 1997. Charred Lullabies. Chapters in an Anthropography of 
Violence Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
De Castro, Eduardo Viveiros. "Cosmological deixis and Amerindian perspectivism." 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (1998): 469-488. 
Fassin, Didier, and Richard Rechtman. 2009. The Empire of Trauma: An inquiry into 
the Condition of Victimhood. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press,  
Gell, Alfred. 1997. "Exalting the King and obstructing the State: a political 
interpretation of royal ritual in Bastar District, Central India." Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute (1997): 433-450. 
Peirano, Mariza GS. 1998. "When anthropology is at home: the different contexts of a 
single discipline." Annual Review of Anthropology : 105-128. 
Robbins, Joel. 2010. “Anthropology, Pentecostalism, and the new Paul: Conversion, 
event, and social transformation.” South Atlantic Quarterly 109(4) 633-52 
Robbins, Joel. 2013. "Beyond the suffering subject: toward an anthropology of the 
good." Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 19.3 ): 447-462. 
Srinivas, Mysore N. 1966. "Some thoughts on the study of one's own society." Social 
Change in Modern India Delhi: Orient Longman: 147-163. 
Srinivas, M. N. 1997. "Practicing social anthropology in India." Annual Review of 
Anthropology 26.1: 1-24. 
Laugier, Sandra. 2009. "Transcendentalism and the ordinary." European Journal of 
Pragmatism and American Philosophy: 1 (1) 53 - 69 
 10 
Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1966. The Savage Mind. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press. 
Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1981. The Naked Man: Introduction to a Science of Mythology: 
New York: Harper & Row.  
Sloterdijk, Peter. 1987. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Trouillot, M. R. 2003. Global Transformations: Anthropology and the Modern World. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan    
*** 
JOEL ROBBINS: WAYS OF FINDING THE GOOD IN ETHNOGRAPHY 
Iris Murdoch (1971: 1) begins the opening essay of her well-known collection The 
Sovereignty of Good with the following observation: 
There is a two-way movement in philosophy, a movement toward the 
building of elaborate theories, and a move back again towards the 
consideration of simple and obvious facts. McTaggart says that time is 
unreal, Moore replies that he has just had his breakfast. Both of these 
aspects of philosophy are necessary to it. 
I had thought at one point I would open my remarks in Moore’s idiom, suggesting 
that Professor Das had made a good argument for the non-existence of the good, and 
then resting my case. But as it turns out, I’ve found I want to walk both sides of the 
street in trying to argue that there is such a thing as the good. I want to adopt Moore’s 
voice to point to some things I think are pretty obvious, or that we as anthropologists 
routinely and with good reason take to be obvious, and that indicate our need at least 
to assume the good exists; but I also want to engage in a bit more elaborate theorizing 
about the good in ways that might not be so simple. Let’s call my first, obvious 
argument, the easy one and the second, slightly less obvious one the hard one. I’d like 
to think the easy argument is the only one I need to make convincingly to carry my 
opposition to the motion, but I also hope that the hard one helps give us a sense of 
why we as anthropologists should care about getting the question of the good right in 
the first place. 
The easy argument has to do with what I take to be our basic model of human action – 
a model I do not think any really interesting anthropologist manages to do without. 
The first sentence of Aristotle’s (2009: 1094a, 1-3) Nichomachean Ethics is as good a 
place as any to turn for a strong, crisp statement of it. “Every art and every inquiry, 
and similarly every action and every choice”, Aristotle tells us, “is thought to aim at 
some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which 
all things aim.” And lest you imagine that Aristotle, despite his current vogue in 
anthropology, is a little too old to be a good guide to how we think now, here is Emile 
Durkheim (2010: 45, his emphasis) giving voice to pretty much the same notion of 
how human action works: “It is psychologically impossible to pursue an end to which 
we are indifferent – i.e. that does not appear to us as good.” On this model of human 
action, people do things because they take them to be good things to do. 
I should pause immediately to clear up one possible confusion. This model of human 
action does not commit us to the assumption that everything people do really is good, 
or even to the assumption that we could reliably render such a judgment in all cases. 
People can for all kinds of reasons be wrong about what is good and hence be 
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motivated to do things we think they should not do, or that we can not be sure they 
should do. All this model of human action commits us to is the idea that human 
beings tend to think some things are good and that this plays a crucial role in shaping 
their actions. I think this observation ought to be enough to convince us that at least in 
this anthropologically meaningful sense the good does in fact exist. 
It ought to convince us not just because it is obvious, but because I think it is a model 
of action which we as anthropologists never get beyond, and probably should never 
get beyond. We should not get beyond it because we need it to help us understand 
why people do what they do and, even more crucially in ethnographic work, to help 
us understand what it is they think they are doing. Let me give you an example of 
what I have in mind. 
Jains, as is well known, hold to the ideal of ahimsa or absolute non-violence. This 
commits them, among other things, to vegetarianism and to taking all possible 
precautions against injuring living beings. Both James Laidlaw (2010) and Anne 
Vallely (2008) have looked at how Jains living outside India, particularly in 
Anglophone countries, have adapted their religion to their new surroundings. Both 
have found that diaspora Jains have made much of the similarities that hold between 
their ahimsa ethic and the ideals important in many branches of the environmental and 
animal rights movements. For younger Jains in particular, especially those born 
overseas, commitment to these movements has become a way, as they see it, of 
expressing their traditional religious commitments in locally meaningful terms. As 
many diaspora Jains appear to understand the matter, taking on environmental and 
animal rights concerns is a simple extension of what they, as people who subscribe to 
the ahimsa ideal, have always done. 
But Laidlaw and Vallely, even as they document the extent to which diaspora Jains 
are quite legitimately able to point to the continuities between traditional Jain 
practices and their own, indicate that in fact what Vallely (2008: 567) calls the 
“overarching goal” of Jain non-violence is utterly changed when it comes to be 
expressed through involvement in environmental and animal-rights concerns. In 
orthodox Jainism, ahimsa aims at spiritual liberation from the Karmic cycle of rebirth. 
As Laidlaw (2010: 69) puts it, for these Jains “The point of cultivating experience of 
the world as teeming with life is to arouse a feeling, which Jains call ‘disgust’ or 
‘revulsion’ with world” that can lead to “self-renunciation” aimed at cultivating non-
violence so as to detach from it. For diaspora Jains, the non-violence of the 
environmental and animal rights ideals by contrast serves to bind them more closely 
to the world, to cultivate in them love for all living things, rather than revulsion from 
them. The point for these Jains is to make the world a better place, not to leave it 
behind.  
My simple point here is that without understanding changing diaspora Jain notions of 
the good - what Vallely’s referred to above as their changing “overarching goals” – 
we could not understand any of this. We could not produce the very elegant analyses 
both Laidlaw and Vallely have given us, because all we would be able to see is a set 
of practices, such as vegetarianism and a heightened attention to nature, that would 
appear to have been simply carried from one place to another and linked up with some 
similar looking practices in the new environment in which they have landed. If we did 
not know that orthodox and diaspora Jains take different things to be good, we would 
simply have little sense of what their practices were about or how they differed from 
one another. Without some notion of the good, ethnography of Jains and of everyone 
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else would at best come to look something like those time-lapse films we have all 
seen, except with nothing we could recognize as flowers blooming, snow melting, or 
hectic traffic finally giving way to empty streets at the end of the loop. And at worst, 
and most likely, ethnography would hardly be worth doing at all. 
Given how obvious I take all this to be, I have had to ask myself why anyone would 
want to argue that the good, at least as an integral component in the production of 
human action, does not exist. I can imagine two reasons one might take this course. 
One of these I’ll take up later, but it makes sense to take up the other here. 
Looking at some of Professor Das’s and Al-Mohammad’s previous work, I wonder if 
their real enemy is not the good per se, and certainly not the kind of good I have been 
defending thus far, but rather the right. Although not as outrageously plastic as the 
ethics/morality pair, which it often seems anyone can define in any way they want, 
the distinction between the right and the good can be pretty semantically variable as 
well. But one established way of using it is to distinguish between moral discussions 
of the good framed in terms of desire, motivation, and goals and those of the right 
framed in terms of obligations, imperatives, and rules (Larmore 1990). The story 
those who make use of this distinction tend to tell is how an ancient focus on the good 
– as in the Aristotle quotation with which I began – gave way to a modern focus on 
the right, a shift that reached it first great expression in Kant’s development of the 
notion of the categorical imperative (see e.g. Larmore 1990, Murdoch 1971: 52). And 
the point of telling this story is to urge a recovery of some appreciation of a morality 
of the good. Those proposing the motion currently under debate seem to me 
somewhat ironically to be working toward the same end. When Das (2012: 134, 137, 
138) writes about ordinary ethics, she opposes it to “rule following,” the “mere 
fulfillment of social obligations demanded by rules and regulations,” and speech that 
takes “the imperative form.” Here it is clear that it is the right stuff, and not the good 
stuff, that she is setting aside. And when Al-Mohammad and Peluso (2012: 44) call 
for an everyday ethic that “would be one in which ethics is neither judged nor 
understood against an ideal of the Good or extracontextual imperatives,” I think they 
are making much the same move, the capital “G” “Good” they are rejecting here 
really standing in for what we should understand as the right. 
I have no problem with setting aside the right in some of the contexts we study – with 
focusing on the ways ethical life is sometimes negotiated without reference to rigid, 
context-transcending rules. But I don’t think that in doing so Das or Al-Mohammad 
and Peluso also get by without implying some notion of the good. If they did, their 
very moving ethnographic accounts of the careful, often quiet ways people living in 
profoundly difficult circumstances help others and acknowledge their dignity would 
have no force. When we read their work, we care that the people who do these things 
do them because they see them as good, even if they have no need to consult an 
abstract moral code to come to this conclusion. 
So much for the easy argument. By now you have probably figured out it takes the 
form of a transcendental one – my basic claim is that without some notion that people 
act toward what they understand to be the good, ethnography itself would be 
impossible. Therefore, I am suggesting, one cannot deny the notion of the good in the 
sense of something people work toward and still be an anthropologist. 
Onwards then, to the hard argument, or at least to one hard argument. The hard 
argument I want to take up has to do with the definite article contained within the 
motion. I take it that my easy argument that people live as if the good exists at least 
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showed that this kind of good exists, but on this understanding there could of course 
be as many goods as there are people who live in terms of them. So that argument 
does not help us much with what it might mean to say that something like “THE” 
good exists. How might we, as anthropologists, think about this claim? 
We are, I think, too convinced, or even in many cases too morally committed, to 
cultural difference and pluralism to posit the existence of a single ultimate good that 
holds universally. We are thus unlikely to accept any definition of THE good that is 
based on a claim that all the various versions of the good we might find in the world 
point to a single overarching one – like, say, pleasure or happiness. Our unwillingness 
to accept such an argument would be a second reason for wanting to claim the good 
does not exist. But perhaps we have the resources at hand to posit that all the varied 
goods we find, even if they don’t point to one summum bonum, do have something in 
common – something we could then take to be constitutive of something like THE 
good across all the various forms in which it appears. 
In his discussion of the good and the right, Charles Larmore (1990: 16) distinguishes 
the “imperative” view of the right from what he calls the “attractive notion of the 
good.” It is this notion of attractiveness I want to focus on in trying to determine what 
might be common to instances of the good. For in choosing this term, Larmore taps 
into one to an important stream of thought that figures the good as something we feel 
has a power to draw us toward itself. Iris Murdoch (1971) frequently refers to this 
attractive power of the good as “magnetic.” Murdoch means this image, I think, to 
capture both the good’s ability to tug at us and its inability sometimes to overcome 
other forces that sometimes tug us in other directions. These other forces, for 
Murdoch, are usually ego-centered, self-serving ones. What the good does is pull us 
outside of ourselves, toward others. Because the good pulls us outside of ourselves, 
for Murdoch (1971: 73) the magnetic center that is the good is also in this sense 
“transcendent,” at least of the persons on whom it has its effects. Durkheim (2010: 
36), it is worth noting, has recourse to similar imagery, for the good, like the sacred, 
attracts us, and “takes us outside ourselves and above our nature” – it takes us, 
ultimately, as with Murdoch, into the social field. 
Now, we can worry over the likely culture-bound nature of the image of the human 
person with its selfish inclinations that both Murdoch and Durkheim are working with 
here, but even if we drop this part of their arguments, I think we, again as 
anthropologists, might be able still to find some value in their idea of the good as an 
attractive force that people find pulling them further and further into social life. We 
might even be able to give this abstract vision some ethnographic flesh. For example, 
one thing an anthropology of the good attuned to these ideas might attend to is the 
way people often coordinate actions in series over time to move ever closer to a good 
that pulls them forward. I have, for example, talked elsewhere about the fact that the 
Urapmin of Papua New Guinea always shake hands with a person when they see him 
or her the for the first time each day (Robbins 2012). The Urapmin like to do this, 
they are drawn to this practice, even as they are also obligated to carry it out (so it is 
right as well as good, but I’ll leave discussion of that for later if anyone wants to ask). 
I have argued that Urapmin people feel this way about hand shaking because it 
realizes what they take to a key good in their social life – the making or affirming of 
social relationships. But they also know that shaking hands is in a sense a minor 
practice of the good. They are even more powerfully drawn to and excited by 
practices that make more elaborate relationships, such as exchanging food, 
exchanging valuables, gardening and hunting together, moving into the same villages, 
 14 
and at the very high end of the scale uniting families in marriage. As ethnographers, 
we need to attend to how the force of the good increases as one moves through these 
various practices that are linked in what Nancy Munn (1986) refers to as chains of 
value transformation, chains we can think of as producing ever more attractive, 
magnetically powerful realizations of the good. 
I dwell on these chains of increasing realization of the good for two reasons. First, I 
think an awareness of the way people concatenate actions to move themselves closer 
and closer to the magnetic center of the good can help us learn to identify the kinds of 
social projects we need, as ethnographers, to understand. But I also dwell on them 
because I think such chains are places we can see the existence of the good in action – 
not in the form of single good acts (which are of course important in themselves), but 
in the making and maintaining of whole ways of life. And it is these, after all, that it is 
our job to understand. 
On this account, what various goods share that lands them in the category of the good 
is this kind of force, a magnetic pull that draws people into various socially 
recognized chains of value transformation, participation in which renders their lives 
properly social. One can be drawn to evil too, of course, and it would take more work 
than I at least have yet done to differentiate this appeal from that of the good. But the 
existence of one kind of force in the world does not invalidate the existence of others, 
so I would not want us to get sidetracked by this problem. 
So much, then, for my easy and hard arguments for the existence of the good. I had 
heard some worry that this debate might turn out to be too philosophical, and I have 
been mindful throughout to argue not just for the existence of the good, but for the 
existence of the good in forms that I think ethnographers both can and should explore. 
Those are the kinds of good we may be best at finding, and in any case, I have 
suggested, they are ones we cannot do without. 
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*** 
HAYDER AL-MOHAMMAD: WE CAN DO WITHOUT THE GOOD 
The motion I seek to defend is: there is no such thing as the good. But, I would be 
happy to go further, as if outright opposition were not far enough, by echoing Bernard 
Williams’ sentiments of God in morality, by saying of the GOOD that it ‘either adds 
to nothing at all, or it adds the wrong sort of thing’ (1997:65). Or, as I should 
probably clarify, not much hinges on ‘the GOOD’ in terms of helping us get closer to 
the struggles for life, well-being and voice which we would like to consider as being 
‘ethical’ in some form or another. However, notions of the GOOD do rest on at least 
two issues which most anthropologists in this room today, I assume, would be most 
unhappy committing to. I can broadly pen these issues under the banners of the 
‘puppet effect’ and the problem of the ‘Who’ and ‘Where’ of ethics. 
Let me begin by addressing the issue of the ‘puppet effect’ with the following rather 
long quote: 
‘Supposing now that nature had here been compliant to our wish and had 
conferred on us that capacity for insight or that illumination [of the Good] 
which we would like to possess or which some perhaps even fancy 
themselves actually possessing ... However, the attitude from which 
actions ought to be done cannot likewise be instilled by any command, 
and the spur to activity is in this [case] immediately at hand and 
external...The conduct of human beings, as long as their nature remained 
as it is, would thus be converted into a mere mechanism, where, as in a 
puppet show, everything would gesticulate well but there would still be 
no life in the figures. However, it is quite different with us.’ (emphasis in 
original Kant 2002 [1788]:185-186) 
This is no quote from Nietzsche, Foucault, Deleuze or any philosophers of the second 
becoming. Not only is the quote from Immanuel Kant’s work, it is also from the 
Critique of Practical Reason – Kant’s most sustained exposition ‘on the moral law 
within me’, as he liked to put it. The problem as Kant sees it, were we to have access 
to what the GOOD is in content, outside of the GOOD as a theoretical posit, or as he 
terms it ‘the unconditioned totality of the object of pure reason’, we would not have 
ethics but dumb rule or command following. If it is stated somewhere in the world 
that it is the GOOD to do such and such, on the model of the GOOD, I do such and 
such, to some degree at least, because it is the GOOD. 
 
Trying to get out of this quandary of norms preceding and determining action by 
suggesting that the GOOD is historically, socially and politically contingent, or 
emerges from social action itself, does not quite cut it. By claiming something like 
that the GOOD emerges from social action to ultimately then coordinate social action 
is to see the social actor as like an artist only to be later swallowed up in her own 
painting. These claims and argumentative strategies do not dispense with the ‘puppet 
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effect’: the GOOD can only have explanatory power if somewhere along the story of 
social life it can be shown to have some determining effect. In Agamben’s terms, and 
I am in full agreement with him here: 
The fact that must constitute the point of departure for any discourse on 
ethics is that there is no essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, no 
biological destiny that humans must enact or realize. This is the only 
reason why something like an ethics can exist, because it is clear that if 
humans were or had to be this or that substance, this or that destiny, no 
ethical experience would be possible – there would be only tasks to be 
done. (1993:42) 
The Good is just such an end – indeed, maybe the end.  
If you’re still unsure if the ‘puppet-’, only tasks to be done, effect is not so serious an 
issue, witness just how odd thinking of our own behaviours and actions in terms of 
the GOOD would be: I showered this morning because it is GOOD to be showered 
than non-showered. I have not killed anyone in my life – you’ll have to take my word 
for that! – because it is GOOD, in and of itself, not to murder someone. And so on ... 
There is something grammatically awkward about these statements which might point 
to the notion of the GOOD as sitting awkwardly within the grammar of our own lives. 
Maybe ...  
 
Kant, the philosopher of the Highest GOOD, saw the problem in substantialising the 
notion of the GOOD. If we had access to the GOOD in content, we would act not 
from within the spontaneity of our practical existence and reasoning, but as a mere 
mechanism, responding almost stimulus/response like. Kant was committed that his 
ethics must also liberate life from the rigidity and conceptual determinism of the 
GOOD in order for there to be such a thing as ethics in the first place.  
What is odd is how Kant, the arch-conceptualist as he is so often taken to be, is so 
aware of this difficulty. Why is Kant struggling not to close off the vivacity of life in 
his account, yet in anthropology we are prepared to posit GOODS which the people 
we work with must have, it seems, almost direct access to? 
For no other reason than argumentative parsimony, Occam’s Razor if we want a 
formal name for it, why posit a second-order explanation of conduct and action when 
there are first-order, immanent accounts and modes of engaging ethical life at hand? I 
shaved my stubble this morning because within the cultural co-ordinates I exist within, 
it is taken, cosmologically, ontologically, deontologically, as preferable for me to be 
shaved rather than unshaved ... How tiring to think all this is going on... 
This leads me to a problem already contained in what I have just spoken about, 
namely the ‘Who’ of ethics.  
We are not a removed Cartesian like subject grounded in some ethereal like res 
cogitans substance that must choose to become ethical. We already are ethical, are 
shaped by ethics, before we ‘breakdown’ and reflect on it. Given a situated, enmeshed 
self, we are ethically thrown. An ethical bearing in one way or another goes all the 
way down. We are always already ethically situated and committed. The moral 
paralysis that alarmists imagine as the result of relativism without a notion of the 
GOOD would be no more a realistic expectation than worrying that readers of 
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Descartes’ Meditations will fall victim to such a radical epistemological doubt that 
they won’t be able to get out of bed in the morning.  
One of the questions that might arise in response to these comments might be: are we 
so fundamentally committed to the ethical world into which we are thrown? Are there 
no appeals beyond our finite ethical engagements and interinvolvements? Such 
questions seem far too quick to me. Finitude means this world of ethical 
understanding must be incomplete, frayed at the edges, even contradictory at its core; 
this is the concealment at work in claims to reveal supposed ethical truths and norms. 
To put it another way, the attempt to make manifest, or cash-out, our pre-theoretical, 
practical, everyday engagements and understandings in terms of this ‘society takes 
such and such to be the GOOD’ effaces more than it reveals.  
Imagine the following scene. I enter someone’s house. I’m asked how I am, how 
things are going. I respond with a nod, or maybe a grimace, depending on my mood 
and the situation. I offer to take my shoes off; I’m told there is no need to. I’m shown 
into the living room. Children are on the floor playing and watching television. They 
say hello to me, and I to them. They collect their toys as much as they possibly can. 
The more comfortable seat is offered to me. I don’t want to be a bother, I saw 
awkwardly. Not at all, make yourself comfortable, one of the hosts says as they place 
a glass of juice on the coffee-table in front of me. I’m left alone briefly and find a 
coaster on another table across the room. I get it quickly in the hope that maybe the 
wood hasn’t stained under the glass of juice. The kerfuffle begins to die down as the 
hosts finally join me, and the children return to playing on the floor, and the toys are 
once again spread across the room ... 
Maybe if this scene were played out in the Middle East, where I work, I might have 
been forced to reference Islam, the twinned shame/honour, or how the glass of juice 
symbolises vitality, or the wooden table male power and authority, or whatever 
version such logics now take in the discipline. But, thankfully, we will be spared this 
today for the above took place in North London in the home of an Anglo-Saxon 
couple for whom we do not seem to have prepared logics and cosmologies as yet. 
From the door to the living room, and eventually sitting down, I myself am not 
confronted by logics of hospitality which I must enact, but possibilities whereby I 
might question; I might step aside to let one of the hosts through, or hold back in 
entering the home or a room in case of something or other. My awkwardness is not 
just borne of unsureness but an attempt to convey a quiet deference to the couple and 
their abode. On other visits to the couples’ home, I have entered with cheer or sadness, 
excitement or sulleness. Each situation, each visit, containing its own possibilities and 
limitations which are never truly made explicit, nor necessarily hold as firm as one 
might imagine.  
An objection here might be: it’s all very well you being uncertain, but what of 
history! Tradition! damnit ... what about culture?! To which my simple response is: 
what about it? Some of you sat here today I know rather well. When we have emailed, 
or called each other the day before an interview, a talk, a conference, workshop and 
panel, trying to workout: is the paper I have written appropriate to the situation? Will 
Professor ‘X’ be offended if I don’t cite her, or cite her in negative terms? What 
should I wear? Should I be early? How early is too early? And so on ... Of my 
interlocutors, you know who you are!, we have inhabited the world of academia for a 
decade or more; we have codes of conduct within the discipline and the institutions 
we work in, and still we can’t figure this darn game out – how odd the ethnographic 
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subject has figured out her world and can so easily locate goods and bads, never 
fluffing the distinction... In truth, we inhabit worlds we are not masters of, and with 
no clear blueprint or principles by which to proceed – no matter how many texts and 
traditions we keep citing and referring to. What we find in the world are not GOODS 
which make claims on us, but oughts. As the philosopher Wilfred Sellars once put it, 
the world is fraught with ought. 
On whom are these oughts placed, however?  
The who of ethics is not the subject, and it is most certainly not the what of 
agglomeration of facts and values that come to form GOODS, no matter how 
contingent those GOODS are asserted to be, and no matter how many ethnographic 
examples we may or may not have. The WHO of ethics may be closer at hand within 
the discipline than we might think. Many anthropologists, of course, have maintained 
the primordiality of sociality or that social relationships constitute the grounds from 
which persons emerge. Our understanding of ethics, and ultimately our move away 
from thinking of the GOOD, must be complicated by taking into much greater 
consideration the relationality, interdependency and intercorporeality of human 
existence, what I have called elsewhere an ethics of being-with. Our ethical lives are 
entangled and enmeshed into the lives of others and this enmeshment indicates not 
only that our existential co-ordinates are ex-centric, that is, outside us, but so to our 
ethical co-ordinates and responsibilities (c.f. Al-Mohammad 2010; Al-Mohammad 
2012). 
That is the point. We are already ethically enmeshed and intertwined such that we do 
not need to conceptually bring together disparate lives under the name of a ‘society’ 
and generally agreed upon or recognised GOODS. If one begins from lives as always 
already related or enmeshed, whatever your preference may be, modes of life need no 
longer to be ‘judged’ in terms of their degree of proximity to or distance from an 
external principle such as the GOOD, but are ‘evaluated’ in terms of the manner by 
which they take on an existence one might, someday, be able to call their own. The 
fundamental question of ethics is not What must I do?, but rather ‘What can I do? 
What am I capable of doing?’ (which is the proper question of an ethics without the 
GOOD).  
Ethics is always undermined by negotiated forms of (ethical) value and/or morality by 
the insistence of a preliminary recognition of some figure or other, some end, some 
GOOD. Ethics is what so many philosophies seeks to isolate and describe, and thus 
render special in some way, distancing the ethical from the ‘everyday’ – the manifold 
possible forms of life that exist before conceptual recognition. Such theorising ignores 
not only the Who of ethics, our always already ethically, intertwined, modes of life, it 
also seems to ignore the Where and When of ethics as it is lived, namely the everyday. 
Everyday ethics does not explain how and why we obey laws or not; it struggles much 
more, it seems to me, with that which we should and can make of ethics, of our lives. 
The claim to explain the reason behind our supposed ‘obedience’ to the GOOD only 
comes from the will to philosophise and theorise. The type of ethics most 
anthropologists find in what we still glibly call to this day ‘fieldwork’, is one which is 
lived, and not necessarily made explicit – or even that which could be made explicit 
(c.f. Al-Mohammad 2011). It emerges from the immanence, the potentiality, of the 
world realised in our own becoming as humans. Ethics, which is an everyday ethics, 
is resolutely lived, as opposed to transcendent, divine, or prescriptive. This form of 
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ethics does not take its authority from outside, but only from within our engagements, 
encounters and understanding of ourselves and the worlds we dwell in.  
Ladies and gentlemen, how awful would it be if there are GOODS in the world and 
our job is simply to enact them, or judge our actions against them? I urge you to vote 
to support the motion: there is no such thing as the GOOD ... and ... and ... if there 
were GOODS in the world, they either add nothing to ethics, or the wrong sort of 
thing ...! Thank you. 
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CHARLES STAFFORD: A SPECIES-LEVEL VIEW OF THE GOOD 
Since my job today is to argue that "there IS such a thing as the good", I might as well 
start by confessing my sins.  
First, I want to confess that while carrying out fieldwork in rural China and Taiwan 
I've never found the behaviour of people I met there especially strange or mysterious. 
Of course, some odd things have happened. In Taiwan, I became friends with a spirit 
medium who - when possessed by a god - would slash his forehead with a long sword 
and then dab the blood from this onto the magical charms he made for his clients. 
Surprising as I found this at first, it was in fact totally conventional spirit medium 
behaviour, and (to state the anthropological truism) once you knew the background it 
made a lot of sense. Crucially, it was not hard for me to imagine becoming a spirit 
medium myself, and in the course of fieldwork I came to appreciate - one might say to 
believe in - the magical efficacy of Chinese gods, especially San Taizi and Mazu.  
By contrast, I've sometimes found the behaviour of my younger sister, Rebecca, 
totally baffling. I'm not sure, but I have the idea that Rebecca's ontological 
commitments are radically different from my own, in spite of the fact that we grew up 
not only in the same society and culture but actually in the same house on 36th Street, 
next door to the Wallace family with their annoying German Schnauzer dog. And I'm 
making a serious point here. I think we need more sibling studies in anthropology. I'm 
confident that such studies would illustrate an important fact: that individual-level 
variation within societies, even within single households, is sometimes more dramatic 
and interesting than aggregate-level variation between societies. After all, the more 
we are talking about humans on aggregate - even if we divide everyone up into 
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separate "societies" or "cultures" - the more we are, by definition, talking about our 
species in general.  
This brings me to Westermarck, and to the question of whether there is such a thing as 
the good. If anybody knew something about cultural variation in ideas of the good it 
was surely Edward Westermarck. His 2-volume doorstop, The origin and 
development of the moral ideas, lays it all out in exhausting Fraser-like detail before 
concluding with an anthropological statement of the obvious: "A mode of conduct 
which among one people is condemned as wrong is among another people viewed 
with indifference or regarded as praiseworthy or enjoined as a duty". In this sense, 
there clearly is no such thing as "the" good, and Westermarck was indeed famous for 
his (controversial) theory of ethical subjectivity, which held that any attempt to devise 
a universal or scientific morality was doomed to failure.  
Being a systematic thinker, however, he was also struck by patterns in the otherwise 
highly variable case studies that he brought together. One point is that humans in all 
societies must deal with the same existential constraints. These include the fact of us 
having to rely on other people who are frequently very unreliable, and who thus 
manage to seriously annoy or even "injure" us in some way. Unsurprisingly, behavior 
of this kind is not appreciated very much in any human society, and tends to be 
judged pretty harshly.  
But the pattern that really struck Westermarck was found in the emotional dimension 
of these moral judgments across cultures. In brief, whatever (culturally variable) view 
of the good we might hold, we are rarely dispassionate judges. When we hear about a 
young man attacking an elderly woman in her own bedroom at night, for instance, we 
actually get upset about it. Conversely, when we hear of a kind act, even on a small 
scale – e.g. someone giving encouragement to a child who is painfully shy and 
withdrawn – it's not just that we think it is good for them to have done this, we 
somehow feel it in our hearts. Or, to give a different kind of example, one that some 
in this audience may find harder to get their brains around, it's not just that people out 
there say that homosexuality is wrong, and then follow this up with a dispassionate 
account of why this is so. The very thought of it being allowed makes some people 
angry; they actually find it disgusting!  
The recurrence of this pattern, i.e. of moral judgments (whatever they are) being 
invested with feeling, led Westermarck to formulate his most important conclusion: 
"... that the moral concepts, which form the predicates of moral judgments, are 
ultimately based on moral emotions" - and in particular those linked to gratitude and 
resentment for helpful and harmful behaviours respectively (738). The origins of 
these emotions are to be found in our shared evolutionary past, but I hasten to add that 
Westermarck is the opposite of a crude universalist. After all, he's just spent hundreds 
of pages telling us (rather tediously, to be honest) about variation in morality across 
societies and through history, and he himself was an experienced ethnographer, one 
who knew perfectly well the complexities of everyday moral and emotional life for 
ordinary people. Indeed, the immersive fieldwork methods of anthropology, typically 
attributed to Malinowski, were arguably just as much the invention of Westermarck
1
 - 
who became a professor at the LSE in 1907 and was one of Malinowski’s mentors.  
It has to be said that Westermarck was ahead of his time, and not just in relation to 
fieldwork. He published a lot on homosexuality, to return to that topic, which is 
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impressive for somebody born in 1862 in Helsinki. Bear in mind that only the year 
before, in 1861, the UK had abolished the centuries old death penalty for buggery, 
replacing it with a minimum ten-year sentence. If Westermarck had been born a mere 
70 years later, I might have met him in the 1980s at the Bell near King's Cross in 
London - where some people had the idea that homosexual promiscuity was actually 
highly moral in principle, even if in practice it resulted in everybody getting crabs. 
This is further proof that morality is historically contingent.  
Westermarck was also ahead of his time with his brand of evolutionary psychology, 
and indeed he is arguably ahead of our time. In recent years many important studies 
on the psychology of moral life have been published. While some of Westermarck’s 
early thoughts on the subject have predictably been superseded, others – including his 
ideas about incest aversion – have been broadly confirmed.2 Meanwhile, only a 
handful of the recent studies have really seriously engaged with the historical-cultural 
environments in which the emotions of moral life play themselves out, which for 
Westermarck was actually the place to start the whole investigation.  
At this point, then, let me go back to my fieldwork in Taiwan, and the spirit medium I 
mentioned at the outset. As I said, I didn't find his (totally conventional) behaviour as 
a medium especially baffling. I should note, however, that he and most of the people 
around him hold moral views that I don't share at all. Among other things, he thinks 
that it is truly terrible for an only son to fail to marry and have children. I don't agree 
with him about this, but I get the point that he actually means it and, moreover, feels it. 
So, sure, the content of morality varies across cultures, but there are strong 
continuities in the processes through which both the spirit medium and I think, feel, 
and ultimately are motivated to act in relation to the good.  
To put my argument in a nutshell: there IS such a thing as the good, however this is to 
be found - as Westermarck suggested - in psychological process as much or more as it 
is to be found in cultural content.
3
  
But here let me change tack and give a different illustration of the same point. Let's 
say that our Taiwanese spirit medium observes somebody doing something bad, e.g. 
sneakily taking away food offerings that have been placed in the local temple by other 
families, right under the noses of the gods. He thinks it’s wrong for this kind of thing 
to be done, and it makes him angry. Note, however, one key feature of this situation: 
his status as the observer rather than the actor, something that will undoubtedly shape 
his evaluation of what unfolds. If he were instead the actor, i.e. if he were the thief of 
the food offerings, it's just about possible that he would judge himself harshly. But it's 
also very possible that, taking everything into account, he would partly or even 
wholly forgive himself, e.g. on the grounds that his children are going hungry and that 
this is what compelled him to do a "bad" thing. We generally know more about 
ourselves than about others, of course, and as social psychologists have long noted 
this may make it cognitively easier for us to forgive ourselves for circumstantial 
reasons, if that is what we want to do.
4
 To frame this in relation to emotions: as 
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 See Arthur Wolf (1995), and Arthur Wolf & William Durham (eds.) (2004). A good starting point for 
exploring recent debates in the psychology of morality is the home page of Jonathan Haidt, which 
contains links to a number of his publications: http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jhaidt/.  
3
 I might note that the really interesting question is the articulation between psychological process and 
cultural content, but the length of this presentation means that I have to leave this question to the side 
for the time being.  
4
 For an interesting, and critical, overview of some of the literature, see B.F. Malle (2006).  
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observers, we may well be angry at wrongdoers, e.g. thieves, even angry enough to 
want them punished. But note that when we ourselves are wrongdoers, by contrast, 
what might provoke anger is being punished for acts that are actually excusable - that 
is, from our perspective.  
Anyway, my guess is that some version of this "actor-observer asymmetry" will be 
found across human cultures, and it would certainly be interesting to test this 
empirically and to study how different cultural environments shape and modify it. 
Perhaps it is even a true universal: that is, that no matter what our culturally 
constituted ideas of the good may be, and whatever actions we are meant to be 
evaluating, one certainty is that (as I see things) I will always come out of it looking 
better than you. There is such a thing as the good, and it is me!  
But this takes me back, finally, to my younger sister, Rebecca. We grew up in the 
same culture and even the same household, so in theory we should have the same 
outlook on life - but we don't. And I should be able to judge her generously, almost as 
generously as I would judge myself, because I have plenty of information about the 
circumstances surrounding her (good and bad) behaviour. But of course I don't judge 
her that nicely, and perhaps it's the case that siblings on the whole don't judge each 
other that nicely.  
In fact, it was notably easier for me to be a generous judge with the spirit mediums I 
met during fieldwork in Taiwan. One could say that the stakes for me in relation to 
their behaviour were quite low, and that my emotions (the pre-requisite for moral 
judgments) were therefore a bit less engaged. Actually, one striking exception to this 
was the time when they accused me - I thought rather unfairly - of having broken their 
rules about spiritual pollution. I found this baffling, and it made me angry, because I 
thought (or at least hoped) that I had behaved quite properly on the occasion in 
question. But the issue in that case was not that I found their morals baffling; what I 
found baffling was that I could be so wrongly accused!
5
 More generally, the 
ethnographer's perspective tends to transform individuals into representatives of the 
aggregate from which they come, for better or worse. Everything is framed in relation 
to culturally-learned behaviours and ideas, and as professional relativists we are 
primed to forgive almost anything our informants do, so long as there is a cultural 
logic behind it.  
By contrast, with my sister Rebecca, whom I know extremely well, the stakes are high 
and my emotions are engaged. She is basically an extended version of me, in some 
senses, and I could easily forgive her, but I don't. Certainly, explaining her behaviour 
away with respect to cultural learning is NOT in the foreground of my mind. Indeed, 
rather than being highly sensitive to what my sister represents about our shared 
culture, I am highly sensitive to the usually tiny, but annoying, ways in which she 
deviates from my personal way of seeing the world. This leads to me treating her as if 
she were from a different species, which I suppose is ok with one's younger sister. But 
what I think it not ok is for us as anthropologists to treat people from different 
cultures, on aggregate, as if they were from a different species. They are from our 
species, I'm trying to argue here, and this means that we do share a view of the good 
with them, in process if not in content.  
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3. THE DEBATE 
Soumhya Venkatesan, Manchester: Veena, you began your presentation in a very 
provocative way. And I am going to ask: if indeed you had opposed the motion, what 
would you have said? 
Veena Das: I think that’s a great question, because it allows me to be two persons at 
the same time. Two things I think I would have said if I was in fact opposing the 
motion, and it would not have been any of the points that either Joel or Charles so 
eloquently made. The first thing would have been that we know we live in kalyug, and 
good can happen and bad can happen and it does not have to do anything with us, 
right, it's a certain kind of play of Gods, and so, I can posit the existence of the good, 
without necessarily having to say that that is exactly the ethical. I think the whole 
point would be that you can have the good without it being the ethical. It's the 
conflation of the ethical and the good that I found extremely problematical in these 
presentations. And the second point I would have made is - well, if I would have been 
really very manipulative, I would have known that here is going to be an audience, 
given that it is rather conventional kind of place - these UK universities - and so most 
people are coming anyhow with the idea that they are going to oppose the motion, and 
since I really don't really believe in the good, I might as well cash in on that particular 
sentiment (laughter in the audience)  
Jonathan Mair, Cambridge: I wonder if all of you could outline briefly, in relation to 
the arguments you made in your respective speeches, how would you define the 
good? 
Hayder Al-Mohammad: As I don't work to a notion of the good, I don't feel I have 
to. I think I can bring the particular versions of the good that exist at the moment 
together and show that they are making several commitments at the same time. I think 
I can show them working to a certain history within Western thinking, and there are 
strong arguments against those. So it is not the good as such, I don't think there is a 
good, there are various versions of the good. 
Jonathan Mair: So which arguments in particular...? 
Hayder Al-Mohammad: Well, if you take Joel Robbins’s argument about how 
cultural values are socially shot through by value distinctions, and there's lot of it that 
tends to be hierarchical, and then you have this notion of the good, and this notion has 
some impact on how you perform and not perform. I already have enough trouble 
with that, and don't need to go further with any more specifics. So I think, if I can say, 
there's a problem with those basic claims, I don't think I could go further. 
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Veena Das: So for me, that's a very interesting question, because it becomes part of 
what negative theologies always have to face, which is really that if you think that the 
particular kind of concept is not a very good concept, then how do you talk about it, 
so that it does not become substantialized in the very process of talking about it? And 
that's why I would basically refuse a definition on the ground that it would 
substantialize something which I think is not to be substantialized. 
Joel Robbins: There are a lot of different possible definitions. So I will stick to the 
two that I was relying on in my opening remarks. And there were two, which is why 
there was the easy and the hard argument. The first argument was that the good is 
what people are aiming for in action, what they desire. Not what is desirable – we'll 
get to that – but what they desire, or want, or feel that they are trying to do, the goals 
of their actions. However small those goals might be; however proximate, or however 
distant. The second, hard argument upped the ante a little bit and tried to define good 
as what people found desirable, what they found was pulling them, not just that they 
wanted it, but even if they did not completely want it, they felt themselves drawn to it. 
They found it somehow desirable because it got them into projects that they wanted to 
be in and it involved other people, other than just themselves. So I was working with 
a notion of the good that I opposed to the right on the basis of attractiveness and the 
desire. So the hard argument did add something like an idea of the normative that 
figures in one’s motivations, or something like that, to a simple claim about the goals 
that actions aim to realize - it turns from the desired to the desirable, which might be a 
subset of what one might desire. 
Charles Stafford: Since I started with the psychology argument, I should stick with 
the psychology argument, but I would note that it is, to some extent, a psychological 
version of the sociological points that Joel was making concerning the human drive 
for the good. Psychologists who work with moral emotions would speak about two 
different things: first, that we are social animals, and therefore it's not surprising that 
things that are generally regarded as being beneficial in social relations, however 
defined, will be seen to be "good". Things that are harmful in terms of the general run 
of social relations will be seen to be “bad". In spite of variation in the content of each, 
some version of this is going to be found everywhere. And for me, that's the good. 
Psychologists also point out, second, that there seems to be another mechanism going 
on, which relates to, for example, disgust reactions. That's a different kind of 
psychological mechanism but in terms of what we think of as good and bad it may 
also play an important role, and it definitely plays an important role in relation to 
things such as incest aversion, which involves disgust. So in that sense, the bad in 
some cases is actually what one finds disgusting. 
Richard Werbner, Manchester: I want to raise some issues about anthropological 
interest in the common good and the public good, as subsumed under the heading of 
the notion of the good. We at the moment, are having to say with the rest of the world, 
that Nelson Mandela is dead, and we are having to think about what his life meant in 
respect of the public good and the common good. Veena, is there is any respect, or 
none, in which a life like that tells us something about the public good? 
Veena Das: Let me pose the Mandela example in relationship to the Gandhi example. 
Gandhi insisted that he did not exemplify something like the common good, that he 
was actually responding every time existentially to a suffering that he saw. In many 
kinds of ways, personages of this kind tend to take away our attention from the kind 
of work notions of public good and common good are actually doing in the world 
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today. So I just take two examples - one, the entire idea of a public good as one which 
involves externalities has not actually related to the fact that whose externalities 
matter right now is absolutely at the heart of this discussions. So in medical 
anthropology in which I work, the diseases which have very strong externalities and 
on which World Health Organisation would really want to put its attention on the 
ground that these are the global public goods that need to be protected - are those that 
threaten the health of the rich in the countries of the West, that have nothing to do 
with what affects the diseases of the poor. That's why the investment in some ways, 
on diseases like HIV/AIDS, when it seemed to be a great threat for the whole world, 
was very, very sharply tuned. The attention to diarrhoeal disease, which could have 
been cured or which could have been prevented for much smaller investment of 
money, receive little sustained attention. So I would say that really, yes, we can get 
some great men sometimes, but instead of the great men's history of what is the 
common good and what is the public good, we actually need to think what is it that 
has been done in the name of public good, so global public good, or common good, at 
this moment, And if we see that, then there is a clear history of power, that I drew 
attention to, and which is so strongly written in this kind of agenda that we need to be 
fairly careful of how we think of these terms. 
Joel Robbins: I am partially responding to Veena's response. One option, and it is a 
necessary option, is to unmask, or at least become aware of the work that the public 
good is doing. But there may be another kind of fight which is to expand and change 
notions of the public good. And in fact, I think when you are talking about global 
health you are talking about having a better global health that serves the good of more 
people. You may not be, but I think that would be a worthwhile project. So part of the 
question is what we anthropologists can do, and in some sense I think the good is a 
concept and a word we are thus reclaiming, and trying to transform in ways that we 
think are important, rather than to simply set aside as damaged beyond repair, in a 
world where frankly we will never be in full control of the terms of debate. 
Veena Das: So I think that there are two real points of difference and this gives me an 
opportunity to go back to your earlier point. You know, it seems so simple and 
obvious to say "well the good is what people desire" - but how lucky for you that you 
think that people's desires are transparent. I mean, take the twelfth century writer, 
Anandvardhan in India who wrote about desire (and this is the reason Lacan picks up 
his theory from Anandvardhan), is that the unconscious only speaks in half-truths, 
that in fact desires can never be expressed as if they were completely transparent. So I 
find it very lucky that in the reflexive turn, everybody knows what their own desires 
are; in your definition of good you know what people's desires are - and I would 
really suggest that we need to make that a little more complicated. On the second 
question - that we must work to make global goods wider and we must do more with 
public health - but we’ve heard those things, we heard them from people like Jim Kim, 
the president of the World Bank, who say the only way to do this is to corporatize 
global public health. So, instead of this large question what are global public goods 
and how do we attend to them, how about just attending to the fact that people in 
slums know what they want, and that they don't want these very large global 
institutions trying to monitor what is global public good. Instead they want water, or 
sanitation, or electricity, but they don't even define it as "the good" - they just define it 
as something which is part of their lives. 
Joel Robbins: You ended in a different place from where you began, because at first 
you said desires are not transparent, and then you told us what people wanted in the 
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slums were pretty transparent. Just to defend myself - I never said that it was 
transparent - if it were, then an anthropology, at least as I am trying to conceive it for 
myself, would not be necessary. So I would not want to say that I think what people 
desire is transparent. I think it takes work, which is why we have something to do. 
Just to clear up that small point, which does not answer your question. 
Veena Das: It is not a small point, because there is a conflation here of desire, and 
wish, and need, which it seems to me that no serious theoretician can actually conflate. 
Hayder Al-Mohammad: I took down a few quotes - "simple and obvious facts", 
"basic model of human action", "appears to us" - I don't know who the "us" is - "as 
good". "We should do". I mean, there is this assumption that there is a transparency 
about what goods are in both what Charles and Joel are saying. But what Charles at 
least is saying 'I can locate in the psychological, if not in content, then in form and 
process at least'. At least we know where Charles stands. But you cannot just say "we 
know it is clear" and then on the other hand "I didn't say it was transparent".  
Joel Robbins: Okay. I think there's two different things I’ve tried to say about 
transparency being conflated here. I tried to be transparent about what I meant by my 
arguments, and about some assumptions I think anthropologists tend to make about 
the nature of action, but I did not claim that every good the people we study 
ethnographically care about is transparent.  
Penny Harvey, Manchester: I think our job as the audience is to try to articulate the 
ways in which the two sides appear to be talking past each other. So, the phrase that 
kept coming into my head is ‘parenting’, and whether we can deal with the paradox 
that we might want to say that the good parent is the one who knows there's no such 
thing as the good. And if you agree with that in any way, the proposers would lose. 
The opponents are basically saying that anthropology should or could explore the 
normative as a situated possibility and that in that kind of notion of parenting that you 
should embrace there's no such thing as the good, that would be a normative 
understanding of particular situations. So then we have an idea of the culturally 
constituted notion of the good that draws people in. And that seems to sit alongside a 
very different argument, which is that anthropology could or should be about how 
people get on with life, how they affirm life in the knowledge that, as Joel put it, "we 
inhabit worlds that are not under our control" and are not necessarily available to us, 
in the way that Veena is just talking about it. So it seems to me that you could hold 
both of those positions at once, and I'd like to suggest that a good anthropology, if we 
think what's the good and what kind of anthropological good are we after, would 
somehow be a combination of those positions, where we would be looking at what 
people feel they should do or what they feel attracted by, but at the same time, we are 
very attentive to how people get on with life, in the knowledge that they can't either 
know, or control it. So it takes me back to that, very kind of middle class British 
notion,, that the best good parent is just a good enough parent, who tries to get by 
without knowing what the good is. 
Veena Das: Let me start by saying that I think there comes a moment when you have 
to state what you really think in pretty oppositional terms, and that it is useful to 
develop the antagonisms rather than to explore the affinities. And that's why it seems 
to me that your example of parenting is a terrific one. When does this anxiety arise, as 
to whether or not this is ‘good enough parenting’ or whether this is ‘good parenting’? 
It rises when a certain confidence in life has already been made to disappear. It's like 
the conversation between Wittgenstein and Moore. Moore says ‘This here is my hand, 
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and how can you deny that?’ - and Wittgenstein says ‘But if I reached the point where 
I began to doubt whether this is my hand, then showing me that this is my hand is not 
going to answer that’. So one might reframe that question and say: ‘what is it about 
the rise of expert knowledge in these cases that has made ordinary acts like parenting 
so untrustworthy?’ Most parents get by, or used to get by, by seeing that their children 
looked happy, that they looked healthy. And if they did not look healthy, things were 
outside their control, right? In the kinds of situations in which I live in and work in, it 
seems to me that the question is never ‘Am I a good enough parent?’ but really 
‘Given this kind of environment in which I live, am I doing whatever I can do to 
sustain the lives of my children?’. 
Hayder Al-Mohammad: In Iraq you have many cases of families that have been 
destroyed, you have people who are weak and vulnerable, having to look after other 
people. So what they do is they go to work, they struggle for other people, but nobody 
is doing this because it is "the good". You do not need that category to say why 
somebody goes out and works for twelve, fourteen hours a day in fifty degrees 
Celsius heat to explain why they struggle for their daughter, their son, their neighbour, 
their friends or what have you. The good does not add anything to that understanding. 
The other thing is, you don't need a notion of value, or culturally specific categories, 
of "mother does this to son, son does this to father". It is very complicated, Iraqis 
don't know what's going on, right? So, then you can't ensure that this notion of the 
good is only to do with parenting. The parents are working to it, they don't need that, 
they are confronting other problems that they continue having to work through. So it 
is the situatedness of life itself, and working through that as an anthropologist, which 
means you don't really need this notion of the good. I don't see what that notion of 
being a good parent adds to explain the case I've just given. It's just redundant. 
Charles Stafford: Penny's comment is a really interesting one. And I agree that the 
developmental perspective is indeed an extremely important one for this particular 
topic, and perhaps it’s a shame that none of us really took that angle - that is, to think 
about children in relation to the good. But it does seem to me that in the end, what 
you’ve suggested sounds like an empirical question, it is the ethnographic project that 
we could all go out and do. And that on its own isn't really going to answer for us the 
theoretical question "Is there any such thing as the good?". The question is: what do 
you do with all the undoubtedly multiple ethnographic cases that we could come up 
with, be it in medical anthropology, or in the anthropology of post-war Iraq, and so on. 
So the question of scaling it up into a theoretical project is what I would be interested 
in, and I think that's what Joel and I were both trying to do in our presentations - he 
more sociologically, I more psychologically. What I object to in the discussion about 
our way of proceeding is the moral judgement that it provokes. The theoretical project 
we’re outlining is somehow objectionable in a way that the ethnographic project is not 
– but why? It seems to me that this is a real problem for anthropologists, that is, the 
assumption that the project which stresses historical variation, cultural variation, and 
so on, is intrinsically more moral than the project that actually stresses, for example, 
the fact that we are all in the same species. To me it's just not obvious at all why that 
argument should be made, and yet, for many anthropologists, and particularly in the 
American cultural anthropology tradition, that is the default argument – for historical 
reasons that we all know very well. I disagree with it. Not only do I feel that my 
argument today is right, I feel that it is the morally superior argument. 
Joel Robbins: Penny, your question immediately engaged me as a parent. So I started 
running through my own experience. But I am not really answering your question, I 
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am answering Hayder’s answer. I think in the descriptions of life that you give us, and 
in your ethnography really powerfully, you've already clumped things up into a 
certain level of description that presumes the goods that those people are aiming at. 
They might not have to think consciously each time that they are doing it. And so, I 
nearly found myself thinking, -’I am a parent, is this a good?’, and so, I think it is 
already stirred in the mix. I could be wrong, but that's what I think. 
Hayder Al-Mohammad: I think this is really important. With reference to Joel’s talk. 
Normativity does not mean normal ; it means ought - how should I behave. So I am 
making a claim that there are social demands. I don't even need to turn to psychology 
to give you an example of normativity. The example I've got -, walking down a busy 
street, we often know how not to bump into one another, right? Erving Goffman says: 
well, it is because people look at each other, they are glancing, their bodies are 
communicating with each other. Then you get Tim Ingold, saying – ‘no, no, it's not a 
mental thing, it's not about vision, there's an embodied sense of where other bodies 
are.’ So they are giving you a metaphysical story about how, walking down the street, 
we order our bodies in relation to other bodies. That story is about normativity. 
Walking down the street, when I see somebody whom I might bump into, I'll open my 
body, I'll slow my gait to let them pass. Bodies make demands and claims on other 
bodies. You can go from the pre-conceptual, everyday forms of walking, to 
theoretical demands that concepts make on us. I have no argument with that. What I 
think Joel has to show, and Joel knows the literature on this, is that normativity does 
not entail the good. You have to make another move. So when Joel starts talking 
about – ‘you have this feeling, this pull of the situation’ - I will give you an example. 
This poor guy that I was working with in Beirut, he saw a suicide bomber who was 
about to blow himself up and jumped on him taking most of the explosion. He 
managed to live for three days. That's not a question of the good, that was split-
second timing, situations pull you in. That's normativity. The next step is, you have to 
show how that normativity gets you to the good. 
Veena Das: I want to make two points. With Charles, for example, I think my trouble 
(is) that this kind of theory of the good always leads you to a place where ‘I am 
morally superior’. I know you might have said it with some irony, but nevertheless 
that's my problem. What about having an anthropology which would leave me with 
those who are damned? You know, because their resources are few, their lives are sad, 
that they are not going to be part of the saved. I think that's one issue. And the second, 
I think that this idea that they are doing all this, but they don't have the theoretical 
conception of it, to the extent that I have any prescriptive bone in my body, I would 
say that idea should really be ruled out. Because it is so patronizing to the way that 
people live because it assumes that either it is that they do not know fully what is 
going on, and we do not know what is fully going on, and if these conversations 
which actually produce the concept; or it is they don't know what is going on, we 
have the superior concepts of the good and the moral which we will then put on them. 
I find the fact that such good men come to that particular position... You know, if Joel 
was one of those vicious people who just wanted to do the colonial project, then I 
would have no difficulty. But that such nice people, who really want the good in the 
world should end up with that position, I think should make us all very, very nervous  
Joel Robbins: In response to Hayder, I was saying that I didn't think in every instance 
you had to find people consciously articulating ideas of the good. I don't mean to say 
that people can't articulate this, I mean in the flow of life, they don't always have to do 
it, for it to be there.  
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Hayder Al-Mohammad: And the normative good? 
Joel Robbins: The normative good - that's the right-good distinction I was trying to 
make. 
John Gledhill, Manchester: I never liked ‘There is no such thing as’ questions, 
because I always associated that philosophically with the taxon reification. In this 
case, we got "the good", so it depends how much emphasis you place on "the". Are 
you talking about some transcendental concept of the good that the anthropologist is 
judging that human subjects can articulate too? Or are you just asking the simple 
question ‘does the good exist in the world in way that is sociologically significant?’ – 
to which the answer is obviously ‘Yes’. I have spent much of my career studying 
social movements that have competing, diametrically opposed, extremely firm 
concepts of the good which are ethically grounded. So Hayder's argument, to try to 
get it out of the window, isn't helpful on that front. But then we get to Charles's 
problem of the individual. Within these movements, which normally commit what 
others regard as barbarities, there are always some individuals who refuse to commit 
the barbarities when it comes to the crunch. What anthropologists study are social 
situations, so that's part of it. But we also know that, as judging, moral beings, our 
ethics is situational as well. I normally oppose to lynching and torturing rapists, but if 
it was my sister, I don't know how I would react. This is why I am in sympathy with 
some of the things Veena was saying. These are the things anthropologists study, and 
these are the things that bring anthropologists of a more engaged type into these really 
difficult dialogues which are not philosophical, or about the ethics and the abstract. 
They are about trying to convince flesh-and-blood human beings to do something else 
in a very precarious position, from the point of view of enunciating any kind of 
alternative perspective which one assumes, being anthropologists, would at least have 
some dialogical rather than foundationalist kind of basis. It is all those levels of 
problems that very easily disappear, but at the root of them is the fact that there are 
these extraordinarily powerful claims to the good existing out there, in the world, that 
do real and very often terrible things to human beings. And we can - as engaged, 
activist kind of people - make all kinds of arguments about the social good, the long 
term consequences, the health of society, however we choose to frame it, but again 
those has to be engaged in those specific social situations, those specific historical 
contexts, they can't be discussed in a lecture theatre in a decaying part of Manchester 
University. 
Charles Stafford: I think that's a very interesting, well-put comment. Obviously, the 
positions Joel and I were taking do indeed have a problem, as Joel explicitly 
acknowledged in his presentation, with the reading of the good, given that “the good” 
can in fact be so bad in the real world. Which is something we know, but it bears 
repeating. Rita Astuti and I have recently become interested in the problem of human 
cooperation, something that psychologists are studying extensively. And there you 
have different versions of exactly the same issue, which is that you start talking about 
this wonderful capacity that human infants have to cooperate. They share, they point 
out information, they follow gazes, so that we can perform joint actions together, et 
cetera, et cetera. It’s an amazing capacity, and people like Michael Tomasello argue 
that this is what makes human cultures and societies possible. We are quite nice to 
each other, compared to other species, we help each other a lot and so on. It's kind of 
a nice story. The problem is that exactly the same skills and capacities are used all the 
time for terrible ends. First of all patterns of cooperation in human societies are often 
very coercive. So, people are cooperating not so much because they have 
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psychological instincts for that, but because they have been bullied into it. And then, 
of course, our instincts often lead to us cooperating to do absolutely appalling things. 
So for us in that work, we are not assuming that cooperation leads to something 
wonderful; and in this debate we are not at all arguing that everything people do is 
wonderful, we do not think that is right. It's a cooperation and coordination problem 
in real human history that often leads to bad outcomes. So I can only agree with the 
point, but I think it does not really work against the position we are arguing for here. 
Hayder Al-Mohammad: I don't disagree with Joel that a lot of what is going on in 
the social is either explicit, or implicit, I am very sympathetic to Aristotle’s book 6 
and 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics that Joel Robbins is talking about. I haven't got a 
problem with that. But I don't have to grant the notion of the good that these social 
groups are talking about any sort of metaphysical security. That's what Joel has to do, 
that's what Charles has to do. Yes, these categories have normative force. I need to 
bring normativity back to this side of the table, because if Joel takes normativity, by 
just saying normativity means the good, then I am finished. But there is no legitimate 
reason for me to accede that normativity equals the good. There is a normative force 
in what you are talking about. and it's not that I don't think these movements are 
aiming toward ends. But as an anthropologist, I try to unpack that, within a sort of 
different context, history, tension, or what have you. So yes, they have normative 
force, they have normative power, but I just don't have to grant it metaphysical 
security. My opponents have to, not me. 
Veena Das: I completely agree that in all human societies that we know of, in 
different kinds of ways, there is a certain sense that to belong to a particular culture is 
also to be able to critique it. I am saying that critique is not necessarily made from 
some perspective of ‘the good’, it can come from various kinds of ways. And second, 
the way I conceptualize it in my work, is that there is an enormous amount of work 
which moves from making the actual everyday into the eventual everyday, so the 
category of the social includes the actual, but it also includes the eventual. And social 
movements are only one way by which that could happen. It is also quite interesting 
that once having invested so much on the idea that social movements are working for 
the good, when these particular notions collapse, it then looks as if there is no 
recognition to the new kinds of projects which people maybe coming out with. So 
there is this whole idea that now social movements have given way to this bad 
cultural production and people don’t want to be engaged in social movements of the 
kind we all were comfortable with – this is a symptom of the fact that when you 
analyse that in the framework of the good, you are then going to be quite indifferent 
to the fact that the emergent forms, which are already always in existence, might take 
this form but might also be ready to take completely different forms. The reason why 
the subaltern movement’s major opposition came from the Marxist-Leninist party was 
precisely because what they were saying was not recognizable within the party 
framework of what was considered to be good. 
Andrew Irving, Manchester: I've got a comment and a question. The comment is to 
Hayder, and his selective use of Kant'. In Kant's Logic, he sets out four questions. The 
first question is “What can I know?”, the second question is “What should I do?”, the 
third question is “What can I hope for?” and the fourth question is “What is a human 
being?”. Kant suggests the first question “What can I know?” you answer in the realm 
of metaphysics, which is what you've been saying, in part. The second question, 
“What should I do?", you answer in the realm of ethics, the third question “What can I 
hope for?” you ask in the realm of theology and religion, and the fourth question, 
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“What is a human being?”, you answer in anthropology. But then Kant goes on to say 
that in fact, you answer all questions in anthropology, because the first three relate to 
the last. And this sets up his anthropological project, and his anthropological project is 
formulated around a very simple statement, which is ‘What nature makes of man, and 
what Man, as a free-acting being, makes of himself’ - with the caveat that this is an 
unfinished mortal being with incomplete knowledge. But the implication there, for 
Kant, is that nature is not fixed, that human beings can change their nature, and this 
was a radical question at the time which Foucault took up in his thesis on Kant's 
anthropology. So, anthropology for Kant is a moral project, it's about moral 
improvement of human beings, and so at some level, there's an aspiration to goodness 
there. So you are telling half the story of Kant, you're not giving the full story. But the 
question is for everybody - I was wondering what people's positions would be if the 
notion was ‘there's no such thing as the bad’? What would your positions be? I'll let 
Hayder answer first. 
Hayder Al-Mohammad: Yes, it is selective, but I wanted to make the point that my 
problem with what anthropology is doing with the notion of the good is the feeling 
that you have to fill that gap - that the good is such and such. That's not the move that 
was being made by Kant. Kant and others are struggling as to how can you have a 
notion of the good - so for Kant if you positivise what the notion of the good is, if you 
give it content, then ethics becomes heteronomous: I find the reason for all the good 
outside of myself. So Kant' problem is: I've got to maintain a situatedness of moral 
reasoning, and I don't have to appeal to external principles, in content, but only in 
form. So I would even be happy with that notion of the good, if my opponents were 
working to that, as a provocation towards something rather good, but which we don't 
know. The problem is, I think, and not just Charles and Joel do it, others do too, 
which is to take the even bigger step and say ‘here's the good and here's the good and 
here's the good’. And once you do that, we have already got the warning bells not just 
from Kant but from Herder and from others of that time in philosophical anthropology, 
which is to say, don't substantialize the notion of the good, do not do it, you'll turn 
people and this into a mere mechanism. So that's what I was trying to do with that. 
But on the issue of the bad, I'll have to think about that, so I'll maybe come back. 
Charles Stafford: I can answer that. Which is to say that I don't know. Because, I am 
being honest here, I think most of my life I've been an immoral nihilist, so in that 
sense there's no such thing as the bad because actually it is all totally meaningless 
anyway, it does not matter what anybody does. In recent months, however, I read 
Derek Parfit’s book, On What Matters. He makes a consequentialist, if you like a 
revised utilitarian argument, to say that many things do really matter. There is good 
and evil, and he gives a very compelling argument why that is so. And basically, 
because I am one of these people who believes the last philosophy book he read, I 
converted from a nihilist to Derek Parfit's consequentialist utilitarianism. The next 
book I read, I may change again. But I guess one point is that when we are posing 
these questions there is an issue whether these are philosophical or anthropological 
questions, and whether it makes any difference which one they are. And obviously in 
practical terms, it does make a big difference, because as an ethnographer I don't 
really want to believe just Derek Parfit’s book, I want to go to a fishing village in 
Taiwan and think about it in the context of life and probably come to answers that 
actually Derek Parfit would not like that much. One point is that he relies heavily on 
trolley experiments, and so far as I know, nobody in Taiwanese fishing villages cares 
at all about trolley-experiment-like problems. It is just not what they are doing. So 
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minimally, I would want to, as an anthropologist, go back to Parfit and say “Okay, I 
am convinced, I am a consequentialist utilitarian now, but could you please read my 
ethnography of moral life in this village and then we can have a conversation?" 
Andrew Irving: So what does that boil down to? Are you for or against it? 
Charles Stafford: Actually, honestly, I think I am still a bit of a nihilist. 
Joel Robbins: Part of what motivated me initially to start thinking about the good 
was a sense that the anthropology I had grown up in, which is not all of anthropology, 
had changed on me. And the anthropology I had grown up on had a certain moral 
nihilism to it. But it was called relativism, and there was a positive doctrine there and 
now I think that's changed. I think anthropologists have done a whole lot on the side 
of the debate that they think some things are bad and I am not sure that one could 
convince people otherwise now, and I am not sure I would want to. But I think that if 
you are going to be that sure about the bad, you also have to begin exploring the good. 
Which turns out to be a lot harder, because it is plural, and this is what drew Kant to 
care about ‘the right’. Because the good was too plural, and you could not base an 
ethical system on that. So I am just going to say that in the background of my concern 
with the good is a sense that we have become comfortable that we know some things 
about the bad, and I think that drives us toward also having to begin to work on the 
good, whether we figure it out completely or not. 
Andrew Irving: So you're still with Charles on that? 
Joel Robbins: You're right. I am with Charles, because I think this gets to habit and 
formation, and all of that - I really was socialised into an anthropology that said there 
was no ‘bad’, and I feel strongly the arguments that would make you want to give that 
up. I could give you a longer argument, which is really not fair to everybody else here, 
but I think if you can get the good in the frame, you can have ‘a bad’ and still do a 
productive kind of anthropology that is attentive to a very wide range of different 
ways people want to live. But I think you’ve got to get ‘the good’ in there to preserve 
that attention to the fact that people do sometimes want to live in different ways than 
others, when you feel more secure in ‘the bad’. 
Veena Das: I think putting either good or bad into this sort of a framing, 'there is no 
such thing', would make it hard for me to think that I would say ‘yes, there is 
something called bad’. It is not clear to me that these are productive terms at all. It is 
true that I’ve worked a lot with where you directly face perpetrators who killed. I also 
hanged around a lot with so-called terrorists. So in some ways it seems to me that 
when I encounter something like real evil, or what registers on me as something I 
can't cope with, is a certain stuttering of language, in the way that Val Daniel 
describes it. It's not at that point a question of does the bad exist or does the good 
exist. So it seems, from my perspective, this whole form of thinking is very, very 
conventional. So philosophically, I really do go along with Wittgenstein, that there is 
a sense in which all ethics is a form of aesthetics, and our forms of life grow criteria. 
So to that extent, I don't understand this question of the opposition between the good 
and the right, because I see that right is something where the criteria tell me in a 
certain sense, that this word really can be extended in this way, it can be projected in 
this way but not in that kind of way. It's not a single form of reasoning that I apply, or 
a categorization that I apply and say, 'this is ABC type of good, and this ABC type of 
right'. I think we really need to be much more daring than settling on such things that 
somehow, people have settled on something called bad so we should have something 
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called good. Because at that point, you know, as Wittgenstein would say, ‘my spade is 
turned’,6 it is not like I can then say 'oh yes, now I can categorize this' and to say 
'these are the forms of bads that people look at’ 
Flavia Kremer, Manchester: I wanted to ask you to unpack how the good and the 
ethical relate to each other. In the beginning of the debate, I was against the motion, 
because I conflated the good with the ethical, and I thought very much in the same 
ways as Charles was arguing, in terms of the good being in process and contextual. So 
I thought about the ethical dilemmas, and the decision anthropologists have to make 
in order to, there's no full ethical science or knowledge, but to do good, to at least try 
to go for the good. But then Veena was saying that the good and the ethical should not 
be conflated. So I would like to see what you have to say to that, to unpack that. 
Veena Das: I think fundamentally it's also the point that Hayder has been making, 
which is that there is a certain way in which the normativist idea that within a 
particular form of life - not according to particular rules, but how criteria are grown - 
we do have a certain kind of sense in which we relate existentially to ways which we 
define as normative. Not because we are striving for it, but because that's where 
human action tends. Joel was talking about his socialization, you have to remember 
that philosophically I come from a kind of tradition within which the theory of social 
action is completely different. I don't mean the Indian anthropological tradition, I 
mean the Indian philosophical tradition. In which you can be there at the beginning of 
action, but you can never be there at the end of action. This is what makes Gandhi say, 
‘I will go on this salt march, even if there are only four people with me. And we will 
see if others will join or not join in - the matter is beyond me". This is the point he 
would repeatedly say, ‘The matter is beyond me’, right - the world has a saying in that. 
So, in that sense it seems to me that the notion of normativity is first, far more 
complex than the simple idea of the good, and if people thought that in proposing it, 
either Hayder or I would basically make some silly arguments like ‘we can't prove the 
existence of the good’ or some kind of metaphysical argument, I would want to say 
that we come strongly anthropologically from the kinds of fieldwork we've done, 
from the kinds of traditions that we come from. And if we indeed we were to diversify 
the way that anthropology is done we would minimally have to say that the motion 
has to be supported, for the fact that minimally it at least gets rid of extremely 
simplistic ways with which we think we can solve the problem by having something 
like "the good" positioned in it. 
Joel Robbins: I think it's a good question. I would just say that as I was thinking 
about what I was going to say today and working on it, I was unsure whether we 
would talk about the good in terms of ethics or not. It's not the only way to talk about 
it, but is certainly one way to talk about it and, except in the part where I was really 
reading a little bit of my colleagues’ work on Jainism, I wasn't particularly talking 
about ethics. But it's a very fair place to go with the question and one of the main 
places to go. But I don't know if it's the only place to go.  
Karen Sykes, Manchester: I believe Alice Munro is going to receive a Nobel prize 
for literature. Munro’s brilliance doesn't lie in how she crafts the story, it's in what she 
says. And when we think about what she says, perhaps it's very interesting to consider 
                                                        
6
 If I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock and my spade is turned. Then I am 
inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do.” ― Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 
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that she has put forward something very different than a novelist might have, or 
previous winners. Because, when you go deeply into the tales that she tells about 
South-western Ontario that I know rather well, the stories show us that people seem to 
be living at great distances or shoulder to shoulder with each other, not necessarily 
having any common purposes, in fact working at greatly different purposes to each 
other. And yet, people have intense, powerful effects on each other without intending 
to. And it's that kind of anthropological project that is actually more demanding of us 
than trying to understand collective action toward a specific goal, or understanding 
how to reframe the practice of anthropology; but grabbing that horizon of the 
discipline itself as a place where almost inscrutable everyday seems to be having very 
intimate and intense effects on human lives. And that would probably be, I think, an 
ethical anthropology. What I'd like to figure out, is then, is the proper title for Joel's 
paper not "Beyond the suffering subject: towards the anthropology of the good", but 
"Beyond the suffering subject: towards the anthropology of atonement"? And taking 
that cue from just the very last lines of Munro's short story "Dear life", she says, ‘All 
around us people say I will never forgive him, it's unforgivable, yet we do it all the 
time and it always is’. So, could we go further with the next project in ethical 
anthropology, by asking not about the good, but about atonement? 
Joel Robbins: It is a complicated question. Because there's partially the question of 
how much people are in relation to each other, and how much they know to each other, 
and how much they act in relation to each other. There is also the fact that we haven't 
talked about many specific practices. I mean I sort of talked about practice in general, 
and we all kind of did. And atonement would be the kind of practice where 
presumably if you wanted to check if people were very self-consciously thinking 
about the good, that might be a place. If it's a different kind of an atonement, a kind of 
atonement for a past anthropology, that wasn't my intention at all. My intention in that 
article was to affirm what anthropology is already doing, and to say that there are 
other things to do as well, and the part I was focusing on was this cluster of things I 
thought could fall under "the good". So it wasn't an attempt to atone for the past 
anthropology. That's a different project, one I am not saying isn't important, but it 
wasn't the project of that article. 
Marilyn Strathern, Cambridge: The arguments seem to me so well distributed that 
it's only for the form's sake that I am actually addressing the opposition, though 
possibly my comment might help them. I don't have a younger sister, I do have 
younger brothers. I would take issue, I think, with the fact that the kind of radical 
divide one experiences is a question of individual variation. I think it's rather a fact 
that the embodiment of a potential for radical divides is there absolutely next door; I 
could have had a sister and that divide could have been with her, not necessarily with 
my brothers. This runs through all kinds of social arrangements, as we know. The 
point I just wondered if the opposition could reflect on, not now to respond to, but 
when you come to do your summing up, is the extent to which your argument rests on 
finding good embodied in particular persons. We had reference to Nelson Mandela of 
course, who is in everybody's minds at the moment, and again, Penny's question about 
good parents. And just something to reflect, if it is useful, on the difference it would 
make if the questions had in fact been whether it's possible ever for an anthropologists 
to describe a person as good. 
Charles Stafford: Your point about sisters and brothers is very good. And obviously 
one of the frustrations of this format is that it is not possible to give an ethnographic 
account that would actually show that Joel and I are aware of that point, which is a 
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deep and important point, and it would be nice to be able to really make that here, and 
explore. On the issue about individuality versus collectives and so on, there’s one 
point I would make, and I think it is an important one: it’s not right that the people 
who are supporting the kind of psychological approach that I am advocating here 
believe in individuals per se, any more than anthropologists. It's just not true. Their 
work is not about individuals, actually. Their work is about relations. It's about joint 
intentionality, it's about joint action, it's about coordination of goals, intentions, et 
cetera. It's all framed in that way. So I think it’s a terrific question, but I think it 
should not be used to necessarily push back against the kind of approach that I am 
advocating here. 
Joel Robbins: I noticed in my own writing that this is a paper that speaks in terms of 
persons and their actions. And I think if the question had been 'what good is to study 
the good?', or 'what might anthropology do with the good that's not bad?', I would 
have talked more - and this goes back to my answer to Andrew's question a little bit - 
about what it would mean for anthropology to represent kinds of goods that are very 
well developed in some places and not perhaps very well developed in the places 
where our audiences tend to come from. I think there are different models of the good 
that are distributed socially in different ways, and that if we know what the bad is, at 
least the question is still open about what the good is, that that is clearly plural, and 
that one thing an anthropology could do is document kinds of good that our 
imagination hasn't taken in yet. ‘Our’ meaning whoever anthropology’s readers are. 
But it is true that when trying to answer the question, ‘is there such thing as the 
good?’, or in trying to say such thing as ‘the good’, I found it hard to look without a 
frame of persons and actions. It's a point well taken, and I didn't find any way around 
it, in any case. 
Rodolfo Maggio, Manchester: To what extent does the motion and the way it is 
designed, allow us to make a specifically anthropological point? The "such as" 
expression is very strong and has powerful bearings on the way in which this motion 
can be defended or posed. It reminded me of the "just" word it the previous debate, 
Ontology is Just Another Word for Culture, which had important bearings on the 
conclusion of the debate and the ways people positioned themselves against or for. 
But because Joel and Veena decided that they wanted to address this issue, I 
formulate my question in two versions. So the first one is for Joel and Veena: please 
outline the reasons you think this motion allows us to make a specifically 
anthropological point. And the second version is for Charles and Hayder, could you 
please tell us, if you could choose another motion to address the issue of the good, 
what would that be, and why? 
Veena Das: Well I think for me, it is not a question of what other motion could that 
be, but an interest in thinking about something that would look very obvious: how 
would anyone oppose the idea that there is good? You go to politicians, they say ‘oh, 
we must strive for the good’, you go to the business ethics schools, they say ‘we must 
strive for the good’, et cetera. For me one of the things anthropology does well is that 
it destabilizes the settled questions of the world. And this whole turn towards the 
anthropology of the good - (speaking to Joel: forgive me, it's not just about the title, 
but about the impact) - was actually falling, from my perspective, into extremely 
conventional ways, of thinking about the world that seemed to have become much 
much more complex. So you know, much around the same time, I was reading books 
by psychologists, but of different kinds to those Charles mentioned, which tended to 
show that preferences were never constant, that depending on how you presented a 
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particular proposition, people could give answers which were completely 
contradictory at different points of time. And the conclusion that was moving towards, 
and which is now a very interesting move, has been to say, we know that the poor 
don't have consistent preferences. It was about people, but it moved into the poor, we 
know that the poor don't have consistent preferences; we know that they change their 
preferences, et cetera, et cetera; so now the role of the policy makers is not the 
aggregation of preferences, but a certain paternalism. So under the neoliberal 
framework there was a very interesting way in which paternalism was introduced, 
precisely in a certain sense, by assuming, and repositioning the notion of the good. So 
increasingly to me it seems like there are such complexities that require much more 
daring thinking, then, you know, settling for the kind of given categories in 
geographies of knowledge which move around the good, bad, ugly, indifferent. So 
you then wonder why, as anthropologists, we cannot think about challenging 
ourselves much more on these questions. So I won't give you another motion, but this 
is what attracted me to this motion.  
Joel Robbins: I had already gone on record, and Veena had already read it, saying 
that I thought the good could do something different in anthropology than what other 
things were doing at the moment. So we knew we had a disagreement that we could 
work through, which is important in a debate. 
Charles Stafford: Following on from Penny I would like to answer a question like 
“Are human infants good at birth?” – because I think that's a question that is 
ethnographically extremely interesting but it also opens up the possibility of figuring 
out - supposing they are good or bad, in some sense, where does that come from? 
Hayder Al-Mohammad: “Does the normative entail the good?” – that would be the 
question I would like to ask. 
Ivan Rajković, Manchester: It seems to me that there is a tension in your 
presentations between so to say moral reasoning and moral engaging, or reasoning 
about what is good and engaging or orienting oneself about the good. So on the one 
hand Veena Das was speaking among other things, about ideologies of the good, and 
Joel Robbins was speaking about moral reasoning, or reasoning that is governed by 
some kind of overarching aims. And on the other hand, we heard about moral 
engagements which are quite situated in Al-Mohammad's case, and feelings, in 
Charles Stafford’s case. This is a crude division between reasoning and engaging, but 
I think there is something there, a tension between these two, and it is an old one. 
What I am wondering if this division responds to different levels, different scales of 
social action in your presentations, or different amounts of agency people have. So, 
what I am asking is how can the answer to our question can be qualified with respect 
to social arrangements we are describing, and to the freedom people might or might 
not have. I am particularly thinking about Elizabeth Povinelli's recent writing about 
division of ethical labour: she writes about the growing division between those who 
can reflect upon the ethical substance so to speak, and those who run their lives 
according to it, or perhaps are that substance. And we anthropologists, philosophers as 
well I suppose, could be the prime example of those who reflect upon it, and I am 
speaking about the level of elevation from circumstances you have to have in order to 
reflect on it in the first place. So what I am actually asking is how different definitions 
of the good relate to different life circumstances, or who can afford what kind of 
moral philosophy. 
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Joel Robbins: I am going to discuss reflection in my final summation so I will leave 
this question till then. 
Veena Das: I think this question of scales is really interesting, as to whether at 
different scales of social life one might think of these very differently. I tend to think 
much more in multi-scalar terms, so that I am very interested not in thinking of global 
health institutions as transcendent categories that stand above something like a social 
flux of life, but the manner in which these scales run into each other. A lot of my 
work has focused on these multi-scalar kinds of effects and I think, very briefly put, 
the whole notion of the good and the bad actually reconfigures at the global level in 
terms of the capacity to tell a success story, which is not a question about ‘is it bad or 
is it good, but have we been able to tell a success story?’ Which explains part of my 
pessimism: when you see all these projects that have been implemented at various 
kinds of levels, having conceded that you would have to ask that question at every 
scale ethnographically again, it seems to me that if the imperative is about telling a 
success story at the global level, then it's that which we should be paying attention to, 
as to what are the ways in which these success stories have actually been crafted.  
Nayanika Mookherjee, Durham: Joel and Charles, I was particularly surprised when 
both of you evoked the idea of the emotions. Charles, you raised the idea of moral 
emotions and Joel raised the idea of alternative notions of the good, the attractive 
notions of the good - something that draws people to it, makes it the good. Going 
back to the point that Veena started with, I am also thinking of Sara Ahmad’s work on 
the cultural politics of emotion, what creates certain emotions to be emotional has a 
certain history and specificity and economy. I would like you to say why you raised 
the emotional question, because for me, that completely weakened the case for the 
opposition. 
Charles Stafford: I am not arguing for the idea that humans have “evolved emotions” 
in some simple sense that stand outside of history. Humans are never not in history, 
they are never not in particular relations with others. That is obviously true. However, 
this doesn't mean that, if you look at thousands of empirical cases from around the 
world and through history, you don't find patterns. This is exactly the Westermarck 
project; you find patterns, and really it is an empirical question, are there patterns 
there or not? If there were no patterns, then you could say - ah, there is the evidence 
that human emotions are totally culturally and historically constructed. But if there are 
patterns, and these are easily found, then you have to explain why those patterns are 
there, so that is really the position that I am taking. I am not making a universalist 
argument for human emotions, I am saying that if there are patterns, these require 
some explanation that makes sense. That's what I would have argued for. 
Nayanika Mookherjee: That is coming down on the side of authenticity of the good, 
surely. 
Charles Stafford: Well, I stressed from the outset that I don't think there is "a good", 
because clearly, definitions of the good vary across cultures. What I am saying is that 
the process of people engaging with the good shows strong patterns across cultures 
and that's because we are in the same species - I apologize for saying so! I mean it's 
the right question, completely, I accept, and I think that it's the notion that explains 
the nervousness of anthropologists, including Veena and Hayder, with the kind of 
argument that we are making here.  
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Joel Robbins: Maybe in a slightly different voice then Charles, I am going to applaud 
your question too and say, exactly. I mean, I don't think anything I was arguing 
precluded that, but wouldn’t it be a part of your ethnography of the emotions and how 
they've come to have a particular set and how they fit together with other things, to 
attend to the emotions that people think are good ones or that lead them to the good 
and the ones that don't? I actually would think that you would have trouble doing an 
anthropology of the emotions in the terms you talked about without bringing 
something like that in, or it would be the lesser for it. But it doesn't in any way 
preclude doing exactly what you said.  
Veena Das: Very briefly, I think my disquiet is not that if you went about it would 
you not find patterns, but in the very formulation of how would you do anthropology 
of emotions. Well, you wouldn’t. Because emotions don't exist somewhere out in the 
world independent of practices within which they are embedded. And, of course, if 
you do the kind of work in which you go around asking people what good emotions 
are, what bad emotions are, you are going to get a story. But unless you recognize that 
this is an artefact of your question, it seems to me that we are in troubled waters, 
because you have assumed in a certain sense, a domain called the anthropology of 
emotions, for which then you devise certain kinds of methods. But you have not first 
examined what kind of object an emotion is. And for me this was very clear - I am 
sorry to come back to one of your papers, Joel - but when you say that we need to 
know where are values, and then you say here are exemplars, and values are really 
showing in all those exemplars. Well you know, we say 'Where is your pain?', but we 
don't say 'Where is your suffering?'. And so really, in a certain sense, that question 
assumes that we know what kind of an object it is that we are talking about. 
Jonathan Mair, Cambridge: At this point that I am deciding where to cast my vote. 
In my mind, on both sides there are three kind of arguments: there's a moral argument, 
a theoretical argument, and an ethnographic argument. The moral argument for the 
proposition is that saying that there is a good might lead us to say that some people 
don't have it, some people are bad, and that would be a bad thing. The moral 
argument for the opposition is either that we have to recognize we are a species, we 
have things in common and that's good, or that in order to recognize the difference in 
morality between cultures and to respect that, now that we have accepted that there is 
evil, we have to admit the good into that. So these are both moral arguments, and I 
can see some force in them. But ultimately, in terms of deciding whether there is a 
good or not, thinking about whether it would be good that there is one or not seems to 
be tangential to that question. The theoretical question seems to be, on the proposition 
side, that ethics doesn't require a notion of the good, or ethics shouldn't be conflated 
with the good. On the opposition side, it seems to be that ethics requires a notion of 
the good, and again I can see the arguments on both sides, but maybe that comes 
down to a question of definitions, and I know that's something that lots of people have 
discussed today. So finally the ethnographic issue which will determine where I cast 
my vote. It seems to be that ethnographic argument of the proposition side is that 
some people are just too involved in the struggle of everyday life, the immediacy of 
making decisions, to think of the good in an abstract way. And the ethnographic 
argument of the opposition seems to be that we can ethnographically and 
psychologically show that some people do act in relation to desires and moral 
emotions, and that they act sometimes in relation to conceptualizations of those 
desires and moral emotions. I'll now ask a version of the question to both sides. The 
question to the proposition, then, is that - Hayder gave an example of a struggling 
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member of a family who is vulnerable but goes out and works in order to do things, 
they don't think about whether it's good; Veena gave an example of subalterns who 
were not acknowledged as being good by social movements and Marxists because 
they did not have a conceptualised idea of that. So your conclusion seems to be, on 
the basis of those ethnographic examples, that there is no good because it is not 
necessary to explain what these people do. But can you defend the thesis that these 
ethnographic examples of where concepts of the good are not important, should lead 
us to abandon an effort at finding a good for every ethnographic case? And the 
version of that question for Charles and Joel, is that given the prevalence of everyday 
ordinary ethics, the immediacy of ethical life, isn't it all very well to speak about an 
anthropology of the good without putting it into practice? But just what would it look 
like ethnographically methodologically, in situations where people maybe do have 
concepts of the good, but that's only really a part of the picture?  
Hayder Al-Mohammad: Part of how you pose the question points to the work of 
Jarrett Zigon, James Faubian… that morally we are too absorbed, that we cannot 
reflect on it, and hence you don't have ethics. My point is that we are morally thrown, 
that the absorption is part of the ethical story. Just because in the absorption you are 
not reflecting on it consciously, doesn't mean it's not an ethical story. That's not my 
version of things. I am saying that we are sort of ethical all the way out. So for me the 
abode where ethics dwells is not in judgement, mental reflection or what have you, it 
dwells in life and existence and intentionality - and I'll talk about it at the end. That's a 
very important thing to do, to try to dethrone the versions of what we are getting from 
certain anthropologists, that ethics is a mode of reflection, has to be made conscious, 
has to be conceptual, has to be intellectual, and so on. I am saying you want to talk 
about the embodied, engaged, absorption, that's part of the ethical itself.  
Jonathan Mair: But not part of the good? 
Hayder Al-Mohammad: Well, I don't have to dethrone the whole notion of the good, 
I have to attack what my colleagues here are proposing, and what they are proposing, 
it seems to me, is resting on the notion of normativity. My problem is, every time you 
propose a notion of the good, I think I can show you a problem with it. With this 
particular version, I think I can show a pretty quick jump from normativity to the 
good, and I think ultimately that if I can show you that, then you should not vote for 
them.  
Veena Das: I want to put these two together and ask what anthropological research is 
about... And part of my argument, which is a theoretical answer, is to say that when in 
my ethnography I have met the kinds of things Val Daniel met, or what I've described, 
where for example people who escaped being brutally killed and burned alive were 
re-enacting the scenes in a spirit of a carnivorous kind of thing - that is the victims 
enacting it - I don't sit down and think ‘Is this the good?’, ‘Is this the bad?’. I am 
really reduced to a certain kind of stuttering. And it seems to me that it is again as 
Wittgenstein said: if you were to say ‘I think that's a goldfinch’, and I say ‘No that's a 
red robin‘, we can debate about it, whether I am right or whether I am wrong; but if I 
say that ‘there is a goldfinch’, and you say ‘but have you thought whether the world 
really exists?’, we've really come to the end of criteria. So I do think that the bigger 
question for anthropology is whether the notion of the good as it has been presented to 
us is in fact too timid an answer to the enormously difficult issues which 
anthropologists are facing now. And the second point I want to make is I am 
completely with you that I would take the ethnography and what does it mean for an 
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ethnographic project as the decisive question because my theory would grow out of 
my ethnography, and there it seems to me that there is no way in which the decision 
to say that – or the kinds of arguments that have been presented, in terms of the notion 
of a fidelity to the event – a notion that people know that there are desirable things 
that they want, seem to me to be conceptually so ridden with problems, the moment 
you begin to think about them, that I am very much hoping that even though 
viscerally you might feel that there must be something wrong in saying that there is 
no such thing as good, intellectually we should probably not be so cowardly and take 
the idea that indeed, very difficult questions requires us to think very innovatively and 
very daringly. 
Joel Robbins: I am going to keep this really short, because I don't think we can 
actually broaden this out at this moment in this debate, but just to say that I don't think 
the good is only the matter of ethics. I think even in the Western tradition, minimally 
it is about beauty, and truth, and probably everywhere it moves in a number of 
different directions. We haven't spelled any of those out, they haven't been part of our 
debate, but I want to get that on the table finally because it came up in what you said 
too. And that would give you a window into some, but not all of those other things 
going on. When you say ethnographically, when the good is going on, you meant the 
ethical is going on, but other things can be going on too. And then of course the bad 
could be going on, if it exists. 
Charles Stafford: Just really quickly, I think if you do an ethnography of “ordinary 
ethics”, if we are going to use that expression, which is something I’ve tried to do in 
Taiwan and China, what you find is that a lot of the everyday behaviour of ordinary 
people is anti-normative in some sense. So if we link up some points here, that's why I 
brought into my earlier discussion the case of me being unhappy about being 
punished – by some of my informants – for breaking their norms. I felt that it was 
terribly unfair that such a thing should happen. And obviously that's where the real 
struggles are, this is what happens in the actual flow of life - it's that constantly there 
are all of these things we are meant to do but we don't do, and by some definition 
that's what ethics is really about. When it comes to our feelings about judging others 
and our feelings about ourselves being judged, I think that's what we observe when 
we do actual ethnography on these topics. 
4. FINAL SUMMARIES 
HAYDER AL-MOHAMMAD 
I just can't impress upon this room just how important the conflation of the normative 
with the good is. I have no intention of trying to win this debate on technicality, but I 
think one of the big messages we can send to anthropologist today is sort of: details 
do matter, distinctions are crucial, and they are explanatory burdens on people to take 
up in these sorts of debates. The explanatory burden is not on me, I don't have to 
show how normativity entails the good. My big strategy today was to try to show that 
really Charles is a psychologist, but he came out and said it. So I've been really bit 
quiet on Charles. For me the big problem is with Joel, because I think Joel and I are 
on the same territory here, and it is very clear to show where the distinction is. Is 
action, all action directed? You know what, I may even say yes to that. But what Joel 
Robbins is showing, and he is not saying all social action is directed towards the good, 
but clearly some action is directed towards the good. I am okay with the story of the 
directionality of social action; what people tend to call that is practical intentionality, 
it has a term, it has a relatively long history, we have ways of talking about the things 
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that Joel already talks about. And as ethnographers, we can ethnographically engage 
with these issues in situ, immanently, but the burden that I feel that Charles and Joel 
have to take on, is why do they need these transcendent category, what does it add to 
normativity. And just to restate what normativity means: oughts, social demands from 
preconceptual, pretheoretical demand to actual categories, concepts, making, forcing 
us, claiming us to do such and such. For all of that, that's normativity. The next step is 
to show how that normativity is the good. There's a story that needs to be told, that's 
extra to that normative story. And if doesn't need to be told, if normativity itself is the 
good, they need to tell that story, because in analytical philosophy, and in ethical 
theory, the claim has always been that if I can show you normativity, I can give you 
ethics. The next jump is to the good. Maybe I misunderstood what's going on, there is 
an opportunity for them to restate it, but there is an explanatory burden on them, the 
explanatory burden is not on me. And just to give you an example of what the story of 
normativity does: in the philosophy of biology - and I am not talking about Deleuze or 
what have you, I am talking about boring, analytical philosophers, right - the 
sociology of biology, Evan Thompson, right, Lenny Moss’ What Genes can't do, 
molecular biology - they are all saying, from Aristotle and Aristotle's biology - that 
yes, biological life makes demands on other biological life, cells makes demands on 
other cells, normativity is shot throughout the whole of the natural order. That's not 
my argument. But that doesn't mean that nature itself is ethical, it doesn't mean that 
nature itself is the good. There is a clear precedent, a historical precedent of a 
distinction between the normative and the good. So when Joel makes a claim that you 
have this experience of being pulled out to act in such and such, and that's the good, 
what I am saying is that story is about normativity, it is not about the good. They must 
show - because I can engage with those examples, I can give you the description of it, 
and I don't have to refer to a notion of the good. If you are going to add that extra 
category, you have to explain why this category is necessary, and I am sorry that this 
is a sort of boring, technical thing, but again and again I pose the issue, and it sort of 
hasn't been taken on. So I think that it's crucial that the normative/good distinction is 
dealt with. Thank you very much. 
VEENA DAS 
I have to say I learned really quite a lot from the questions. But I do want to go back 
and say: first, we really need to ask - what kind of talk does this talk of the good 
release in the world? What kind of effects does it have? And for me, it’s not 
inconsequential that part of the effects that it has had is to abrogate a certain right to 
theorise within anthropology on the ground that events that happened in American 
anthropology must have their shadow in other places too. So the fact that this kind of 
theorising can be done on the basis of the fact that we are talking now about the 
anthropology of the good, recalls for me very traumatic events, I must say, in which it 
was precisely the kind of notion that we really can wipe away the specific histories 
through which anthropology was done in other places. Most substantively, it seems to 
me, that the second issue which probably actually follows from the first is a particular 
picture of the good which relies on a picture of the ethical, in which the ethical 
consists in the moment when we stand apart and reflect on the on-going ways in 
which life is practically lived. And the problem with that particular formulation is 
again in an implicit hierarchy and dominance that it builds in which people might be 
ethical, but they don't really know they are ethical. It reminds me really of the Pope 
saying, 'Oh yes, there are some Hindus who can be saved, because unknown to 
themselves they are good Christians’. And it seem to me that what is really at stake 
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over here is the right to think more deeply about what it is that allows the kinds of 
ethnographies that have been produced, which I again want to emphasise, do not rely 
– differently, I think, from what Joel thinks - on the notion that there is something 
called human, and we can directly connect with that human. Actually what they tend 
to show is that our notions of the good, our notions of what it means to be human, are 
actually severely questioned, at those particular points, and at that particular point, it 
seems to me, that to simply say that we can give you a laundry list of what constitutes 
the good, and we can also enumerate what constitutes the bad, simply does not 
address the kinds of ethnography that many anthropologists have been looking at. So, 
I want to think about how even within philosophy, if you think about Cora Diamond 
for example, you know, her essay The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of 
Philosophy is actually arguing that the particular parts to which moral philosophy is 
accustomed, actually become silent even in the face of something as simple as the fact 
that Mrs Costello is wounded by the fact that she has this rawness of nerves about the 
fact that animals that she can imagine as companions are actually eaten by others. 
There's no theory of the good or the bad that will actually attend to that kind of 
rawness of nerves, and I am really asking that we think more theoretically, more 
deeply, before settling on the kinds of concepts that the notion of the good and the 
notion of the bad evoke. And my last point is, that the picture of the good, namely this 
idea that we cannot do ethnography unless we have some idea of the good, is an 
extremely reified notion of the social. First, people have done in those circumstances, 
and second, it seems to me that this very reified notion that people's sociality is a 
certain form of realising the good which we know and we can actually conceptualize 
seems to me to be a very impoverished notion of how we do ethnography, what does 
doing ethnography mean, and you know, for those of us who weren't doing 
ethnography coming from the West and looking at this Other who must be this exotic 
Other, we were looking at the Other who could be me, right? And under those 
circumstances, I think to wipe that an entire history of anthropology, even if it was 
one done in peripheral places, would seem to me to be something which, you know, 
very enlightened audience over here would really like to resist. The last point I want 
to make is, look, anthropologists are not economists, and they are not doing what 
psychologists doing their research in their laboratories do. Anthropologists are people 
who have unsettled the world, right? They unsettled the world by what they have 
brought to light, the unsettled the world by the concepts that they have questioned. So 
in some ways, I wish this was a revolutionary move - by positing that we are going 
toward the anthropology of the good, I wish that it had done that kind of unsettling, 
but to me it seems that it goes back to the kind of moralism that people like Austin 
tried to resist, the kind of moralism that Wittgenstein tried to resist, and the kind of 
moralism that even if it is postulated as if stands against the moralism, has the great 
danger of ultimately reinstating the notion that indeed we can control, we can sanctify, 
we can sanitize the world, because we know what we can think about the good and 
the bad. And so I'd ask you to strongly - or at least moderately support the motion - in 
lieu of the fact that your notion of what is at stake for anthropology is the more 
important question than the idea of whether there are more votes here or more votes 
there. Thank you very much. 
JOEL ROBBINS  
I am in a slightly tricky position and I'm going to take a certain route through it, 
which is, hmmm… Veena has really flattered me by reading my work very carefully 
and raising disagreements. And reading more than one piece - how often does that 
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happen? Although of course, you know the old joke about somebody with two 
watches that has no idea about what time it is. You wish people would read one at a 
time. Anyway, it's enormously flattering, and her criticisms are important. They didn't 
come up in the discussion very much, and I am going to assume that's because people 
are not thinking these prior works are the heart of the matter. I do have answers to 
some of the things that she's talked about, though they may or may not be answers 
that would satisfy you. But I am not going on dwell on defending my written work, 
which I assume many of you haven't read in any case. I'd certainly be happy to do that 
later. But what I would like to take up now is what I take to be a more general 
argument about the good in Veena's remarks, that the good either makes us miss very 
important things, including some bad things, but other kinds of things too, or that 
studying the good precludes us from studying the conditions which make the good 
meaningful to us, regardless of whether we think it's meaningful or not to the people 
that we study. And I think that the question of the existence of the good has been 
clouded by both of these kinds of questions. In saying this, I mean the good could 
exist and we can attend to it or not, and our attending to it could wreck our 
ethnography or not, or make anthropology more timid or not, or any of those things, 
but that wouldn't bear on its existence. But to the extent that I have wanted to argue 
that you do better ethnography when you attend to the good, then I would also go on 
to argue that I don't think studying the good precludes studying any of these other 
things. You would certainly have very thin soup if you only studied the good. But I 
also want to say is that you are going to have thin soup if you don't attend to it at all, 
to what people take to be the good, and if you don't allow that to direct some of your 
attention in the field. I also would add on this that I do think that the anthropology of 
the good does have a critical vocation, I think at this moment in anthropology it is 
about enlarging our sense of what there is in the world that we want to attend to and 
recovering a certain critical force for the idea of difference that made anthropology 
important in many places at many times. And so, I actually think the study of the 
good does have a critical vocation, and it allows us to bring into debate and discussion 
things we miss if we don't focus on it. So that's the answer I'd like to give toward 
Veena. 
Hayder has set up a really clear topic for debate, which is the issue of the normative. 
I'll get to that. I do want to question the notion that there is no good in everyday life, 
that everyday life gets on without a notion of the good. I also took a shower today, 
and if you asked me why, I would give you an account of why I did that. And if I 
asked Hayder why, outside in the coffee line, I think he would give an account of why 
he did that. And I think people are always capable – not always, not every moment, 
but very often – capable of giving accounts of what they do and very often, those 
accounts include what they think what they do is good for. And I think, as 
ethnographers, we learn a tremendous amount from those accounts, that those are 
often what open us up to what the kinds of things going on around us are about. So I 
think that the good is there is in everyday life. I think for some people, this is back to 
that very penultimate question about the sort of division of ethical labour, some 
people are positioned such that they are constantly giving accounts and thinking about 
other people’s accounts, and some people wait to give an account until they are asked 
to account for themselves. But I do think that people can account for themselves and 
when they do, they do so in terms of the good. And now we get to the normative and 
the good. This is truly challenging, and this is a real debate. And I wish I controlled 
the philosophy well enough to get on Hayder's level with it, but I'm going to do the 
best that I can. I used 'the good' and 'the right', and I took a lot of care to define them 
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both. So you can take or leave my definitions, but I’ve said over here on the side of 
the good are a bunch of things about desire, and goals, and attraction, and over here 
on the side of the right are a bunch of things about obligation, command, imperative. 
And that is certainly one way to make this distinction. I think what the normative is, is 
the framework in which things have to be done in order to appear to others. I think we 
are locked in the normative socially because otherwise we don't appear to our fellows 
and we can't get anything done if we don't do it in normative ways. That can feel very 
coercive … but I think that in what we want to do, the things that we take up, the 
normative project of doing things correctly, or in the right way, are things that we are 
often driven to do by something more than just wanting to meet these norms 
themselves, we do them, because of our sense of the good, what we want to 
accomplish. So I think that we engage the normative out of motivations that are not 
themselves always given in the normative. I would point out that in writing the little 
piece that I began with, I reread Durkheim’s The Determination of Moral Facts. In 
this piece, Durkheim said these things are always mixed up, the normative and the 
good are always mixed up, but the proportions of the normative and the good in play 
in any moment shift. Some things we do mostly because they are normative, some 
things we do mostly because they are good. And it is good that the good is not the 
normative, because this is how change and critique can ever come up. Thanks. 
CHARLES STAFFORD 
Having said a moment ago that I was a nihilist, I now would like to clarify that a bit. 
And perhaps this actually proves that there is such a thing as the good, because I 
actually do care about what you think of me (laughter in the audience), which of 
course a nihilist should not do. Among other things, I care what you think about my 
relationship with my sister Rebecca, so I want to stick a footnote in here, which is to 
say that I have a wonderful relationship with my sister Rebecca, I am actually having 
a reunion with her on Friday! But I do believe, as I argued in my presentation, that 
sibling relationships are an extremely interesting phenomenon to examine if we want 
to think about the good. Siblings are representatives not just of humans on aggregate, 
they are also of course representatives of particular societies – that is, of the good as 
defined in the particular social order that they've come from. And yet in another way 
they are not: when we actually have to deal with siblings there are many opportunities 
for us to have conflicts with them in spite of our shared cultural background. What I 
was suggesting is that – as with cross-cultural comparison so it is with siblings - there 
is not “a good”, if by that we mean a particular content that everybody could agree on 
universally. Therefore the only good that we can hope for here is related to process, 
that is, a human way in which we approach moral and ethical problems of various 
kinds. One thing I really want to stress is in response to both what Hayder and Veena 
have argued - at the end quite forcefully, and obviously the arguments they make are 
very compelling ones for anthropologists, it's an argument about the morality of 
anthropology, so it's very difficult for us to just dismiss that. So I really want to stress 
again that the kinds of things that Joel and I are trying to push for here, it's not some 
sort of crude universalism; in particular it's not normative. I just don't accept this 
critique at all. On the contrary, I think if you look at ethnographic work that either 
Joel or I have done on ethical and moral life, it's all about conflict, absolutely, that's 
what's there, that's the nature of human moral life. The struggle for the good is often a 
struggle precisely over the normative - that's the ethnographic material that we all get 
back to as anthropologists. I also reject the claim that this is a non-historical or anti-
historical approach that we've put up, that we are ignoring, if you like, the 
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complicated history of anthropology in coming to the position that we've come to. On 
the contrary, I am trying to stake a moral claim for the position that I am taking here, 
actually. I am saying that the morality of our argument is indeed better than the 
morality of the argument that Hayder and Veena are putting forward. And I think this 
is a very difficult position for anthropologists to get their brains around, but I mean it. 
I sincerely mean it. And I hope you are going to support me in that. On the question 
of moral reasoning versus moral engagement, this really important and interesting 
question that was brought out, which I think in a way really gets to the core of a lot of 
things that we've been talking about today - there's very interesting work by Dan 
Sperber and his colleagues on moral reasoning, anthropologists should read him on 
moral reasoning if nothing else. And the point he makes is that humans are not very 
good at reasoning in general. It is surprising how bad we are at reasoning, in fact, and 
this raises the question of why we have this capacity to reason at all. And the 
argument is that human reasoning, including moral reasoning, is not there for a 
private psychological reason as it were - 'I am going to arrive at the correct decision 
or correct moral position' - it is because reasoning it there for argumentative purposes. 
Moral reasoning is fundamentally argumentative, thus relational, therefore it is totally 
social, it is never individual, it is absolutely in history. So in fact the “individual” 
processes of moral reasoning and the social activity of moral engagement are actually 
completely articulated. It's a false distinction to make in the first place. So this is yet 
another example of a way in which the process of getting at the good is a ‘the’ - even 
if the content of the good is not a ‘the’ - and in case you didn't follow that, it means 
you have to vote with me! 
5. THE VOTE 
For the motion: 31 
Against the motion: 43 
Abstentions: 7 
The motion has been defeated. 
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